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PROOF OF ECONOMIC POWER IN A SHERMAN ACT
TYING ARRANGEMENT CASE: SHOULD ECONOMIC
POWER BE PRESUMED WHEN THE TYING PRODUCT
IS PATENTED OR COPYRIGHTED?
J. Dianne Brinson*
INTRODUCTION
In a tying arrangement, a seller conditions a buyer's purchase of
one product on the buyer's willingness to take a second product as well.
The buyer can obtain the desired "tying" product only by agreeing to
also take the seller's less desirable "tied" product.' Over the years,
various tying arrangements have been held illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act 2 and under section 3 of the Clayton Act.3
According to the most recent Supreme Court tying arrangement case,
the Sherman Act case of Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde,4 the '.'essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies
Copyright 1987, by LoUIsIANA LAW REvraw.
Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A., Duke Uni-
versity; J.D., Yale Law School.
1. The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from
any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6, 78 S. Ct. 514,
518 (1958). Other terms which courts have used for this type of contract include "tie-
in," "tying agreement," and "tying device."
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). For section 3 of the Clayton Act to apply, the tying and
tied products must be "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities."
Legal scholars versed in economics have been highly critical of the Supreme Court cases
developing the prohibition against tying arrangements. See, e.g., R. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox 372-74 (1978); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale
L.J. 19 (1957); Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 Yale L.J.
1397 (1967); Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 626
(1965); and Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev.
506, 508-15 (1974). Economists' criticisms are discussed more fully at infra notes 48-61
and accompanying text.
4. 466 U.S. 2, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). The other Supreme Court tying arrangement
cases are United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 97 S. Ct. 861
(1977) [Fortner II]; Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 89
S. Ct. 1252 (1969) [Fortner 1]; United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97
(1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 872 (1958); Times-
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in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did
not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on
different terms." 5 When such "forcing" occurs, "competition on the
merits in the market for the tied item is restrained," 6 in violation of
the Sherman Act's prohibition of "contract[s] . . . in restraint of trade." 7
If the seller is able to force the buyer to take the unwanted product,
the resulting restraint in trade, in the view of the Supreme Court, presents
a two fold threat to competition: (1) Buyers are deprived of the op-
portunity to select the "best bargain" in the tied product market;8 and
(2) other sellers of the tied product are deprived of the opportunity to
have their versions of the tied product compete "on the merits" with
the tying seller's tied product. 9
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 78 S. Ct. 514 (1953); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S. Ct. 915 (1948); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S. Ct. 618 (1940); International Business Machs. Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131, 56 S. Ct. 701 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States,
258 U.S. 451, 42 S. Ct. 363 (1922); and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 247
U.S. 32, 28 S. Ct. 473 (1918).
5. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 12, 104 S. Ct. at 1558. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion
of the Court in Hyde, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice
Brennan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice O'Connor
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist joined.
6. Id.
7. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
8. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 15, 104 S. Ct. at 1560.
9. Id. at 14-15, 104 S. Ct. at 1559-60. According to earlier tying arrangement cases,
the major threat that tying arrangements presented to competition was "leverage": A
tying arrangement could be a means of extending a monopoly in the tying product to
the tied product. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 611, 73 S. Ct. 872, 882 (1953); and United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45,
83 S. Ct. 97, 102 (1962). The "leverage" theory has been widely criticized. See generally
Pearson, supra note 3, at 639-51 (discussing and criticizing the "leverage" (monopoly
extension) charge against tying arrangements); Posner, supra note 3, at 508; and Turner,
The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50, 60
(1958). These criticisms are discussed more fully infra at notes 48-61 and accompanying
text. The majority opinion in Hyde, possibly as a result of these criticisms, mentions the
"monopoly extension" concern only in a footnote, 466 U.S. at 13 n.19, 104 S. Ct. at
1558 n.19 (quoting Justice White's dissenting opinion in Fortner 1, 394 U.S. 495, 89 S.
Ct. 1252 (1969)), emphasizing instead the harm a tie-in presents to tied product sellers
and to consumers. 466 U.S. at 14, 104 S. Ct. at 1559. Justice O'Connor, in her opinion
concurring in the judgment in Hyde, states that "[t]ying may be economically harmful
primarily in the rare cases where power in the market for the tying product is used to
create additional market power in the market for the tied product." 466 U.S. at 36, 104
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Although the language of section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns
all contracts in restraint of trade, judicial interpretation has long estab-
lished that only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate
section 1.10 Some types of contracts are per se illegal, i.e., conclusively
presumed to be "unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the excuse for their
use."" A tying arrangement is per se illegal if (1) the tying seller has
sufficient economic power in the tying product to be able to force buyers
to take the tied product; and (2) the tying arrangement has an effect
on a .'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce.''2
S. Ct. at 1571.
In Hyde, the Supreme Court also recognized the possibility that a tying arrangement
may create barriers to entry in the tied product market, 466 U.S. at 14, 104 S. Ct. at
1559; and may be a vehicle for price discrimination, a view shared by economists, 466
U.S at 14-15 and n.23, 104 S. Ct. at 1559-60 and n.23. See generally Bowman, supra
note 3, at 23-24; Butler, Lane & Phillips, The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In
Sales: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 36 Hastings L. J. 173 (1984); and Posner, supra
note 3, at 508-10. Price discrimination is discussed infra at notes 55-61 and accompanying
text.
10. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911).
11. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S. Ct. 514, 518 (1958).
As the Court further stated in Northern Pacific,
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone
concerned, but it also avoids the necessity of an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation ... [,] an inquiry so often wholly fruitless
when undertaken.
Id.
For practices that do not fall in one of the categories of per se illegality, the trier of
fact must, under the "rule of reason" approach, consider all factors and circumstances
which might condemn or justify the defendant's behavior. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39, 38 S. Ct. 242, 244 (1918).
12. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 16, 104 S. Ct. at 1560; Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6, 78
S. Ct. at 518.
Despite the use of the per se rule to judge the legality of tying arrangements, the courts
have been willing to consider possible business justifications for a tie-in. The most famous
such case is United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 555-60 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567, 81 S. Ct. 755 (1961), which indicated that the
use of a tie-in to facilitate the development of a new product (cable television equipment)
could be lawful. The other common justification defense is the "goodwill defense," e.g.,
Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam,
299 U.S. 3, 57 S. Ct. 1 (1936) (upholding a General Motors requirement that GM dealers
use only GM parts). See generally W. Holmes, Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law
§ 20.02 (1985).
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment in Hyde (together with Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist), stated that "[t]he time has ... come to
abandon the 'per se' label" for tying arrangements. 466 U.S. at 35, 104 S. Ct. at 1570.
According to Justice O'Connor, the use of the per se rule in tying cases "incurs the
costs of a rule-of-reason approach without achieving its benefits." Id. at 34, 104 S. Ct.
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The focus of this article is on the economic power element of per
se tying arrangement illegality.' 3 According to a 1962 Supreme Court
at 1570. Since a tying arrangement is per se illegal only if the seller has economic power
in the tying product, the per se doctrine is only applied to tying arrangements after an
"elaborate inifliry into the economic effects" of the arrangement, an inquiry that is
avoided in other areas of per se rule applicability (price-fixing agreements, for example).
Id. •
The Department of Justice, in its 1985 Guidelines on Vertical Distribution Restraints
[hereinafter referred to as Guidelines] has indicated that it will not challenge a tie-in if
the tying seller has a market share of thirty percent or less in the tying product market.
The presumption that such a tie-in is legal can be overcome only by a showing that the
tie-in has unreasonably restrained competition in the tied product market. If the tying
seller has a market share over thirty percent, the Department will apply the per se rule
if it finds that the seller has "dominant" market power. 50 Fed. Reg. 6263, 6272 (1985).
A tying arrangement that does not have the attributes of per se illegality could violate
the Sherman .Act under a rule of reason approach on the basis of. evidence that the
arrangement unreasonably restrained trade in the relevant market. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 18,.
104 S. Ct..at 1561; Fortner 1, 394 U.S. 495, 499-500, 89 S. Ct. 1252, 1256-57 (1969).
This aspect of the Fortner I opinion is criticized in Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United
States Steel: "Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be," 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32-36. In
Hyde, the Court, after concluding that the elements of a per se violation had not been
established, scrutinized the allegedly illegal contract under the rule of reason. 466 U.S.
at 29-31, 104 S. Ct. at 1567-68. The Court, not surprisingly, concluded that the respondent
had not made out a case under the rule of reason. Id. at 31, 109 S. Ct. at 1568. A
plaintiff is rarely able to establish an antitrust law violation under the rule of reason.
In Times-Picayune the Supreme Court developed different Sherman Act and Clayton
Act standards for applying the per se rule to tying arrangements. 345 U.S. 594, 608-09,
73 S. Ct. 872, 880 (1953). Commentators have questioned whether there are still two tests
or now only one test for both statutes, the harsher Sherman Act test set out in Times-
Picayune. See 16A Business Organizations, Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade
Regulation § 6G.05[2] (1986); Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 283, 285 (1980); and Note, The Logic
of Foreclosure: Tie-in Doctrine after Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 Yale L.J. 86 n.1 (1969).
In any event, this article will concentrate on Sherman Act standards for per se rule tying
arrangement illegality.
13. Generally, the courts, before inquiring as to the existence of economic power,
determine whether the seller has tied two products or sold a single multi-component
product. If there is no linkage of two separate product markets, there is no tying
arrangement. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 19-20, 104 S. Ct. at 1562; Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at
613-14, 73 S. Ct. at 883-84.
According to Fortner I, in considering whether a tying arrangement has the "effect on
commerce" that makes the per se rule applicable, "normally the controlling consideration
is simply whether a total amount of business,. substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume
so as not to be merely de minimus, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie." 394 U.S.
at 501, 89 S. Ct. at 1258. One must, in deciding the substantiality of the volume of
foreclosed commerce, look at all of the seller's tied sales, not just at sales to the plaintiff.
Id. at 502, 89 S. Ct. at 1257. Hyde, citing Fortner I, states that the "commerce"
requirement is met by a showing that "a substantial volume of commerce is foreclosed
close thereby." 466 U.S. at 16, 104 S. Ct. at 1560. According to the Justice Department
the tie-in must have "a substantial adverse effect in the tied product market" for the
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case, United States v. Loew's Inc.,' 4 "the requisite economic power [for
per se condemnation of the tying arrangement] is presumed when the
tying product is patented or copyrighted."' 5 The Supreme'Court has
not reviewed a tying arrangement case involving a patented or copy-
righted tying product since the Loew's decision.' 6 According to dicta in
the two most recent Supreme Court tying arrangement cases, Hyde and
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises (Fortner 1/),17 the Loew's
per se rule to apply. Guidelines § 5.2. The National Association of Attorneys Generals'
December, 1985 Vertical Restraints Guidelines [hereinafter referred to as NAAG Guidelines]
criticized the Justice Department's Guidelines on this point, stating that Justice, in requiring
a finding of actual substantial adverse effect for per se illegality, imposed an additional
element on the.Supreme Court's Hyde per se test. NAAG Guidelines § 5.1 n.59.
14. 371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962).
15. Id. at 45, 103 S. Ct. at 102. For a discussion of whether the Loew's presumption
is conclusive or rebuttable, see infra notes 116-38 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether economic power should
be presumed from the existence of a trademark on the tying product. Among the lower
courts the majority view seems to be. that economic power is not to be presumed from
a trademark. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d
Cir. 1974); and Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc:, 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976). But
see Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955, 92 S. Ct. 1172 (1972), in which the court appears to have extended the Loew's
presumption to trademarks. Some later trial court decisions have construed Siegel as having
found that economic power. had been established not just from the existence of the
defendant's trademark on the tying product, but from the fact that the defendant's
trademark was distinctive and carried with it goodwill and public acceptance. See, e.g.,
Cash v. Arctic Circle, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 618, 621 (E.D. Wash. 1979). The "trademark
presumption" is discussed in Von Kalinowski, supra note 12, § 6G.05[2]; Lavey, Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks As Sources ofMarket Power in Antitrust Cases, 28 Antitrust
Bull. 433, 448-51 (1982); and Smirti, Trademarks as Tying Products:.The Presumption
of Economic Power, 69 Trademark Rev. 1 (1979).
16. The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to reconsider the presumption's
validity when it denied certiorari in Data General Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S.
908, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985). Justices White and Blackmun dissented to the denial of
certiorari, stating that the case raised "substantial questions of antitrust law and policy."
Id. at 909, 105 S. Ct. at 3535.
The lower court Data General decisions, In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490
F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) and 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1981), and Digidyne
Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) are discussed at infra notes
108-15 and accompanying text, at infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text, and at infra
notes 192-99 and accompanying text; and in Note, Tying Arrangements and the Computer
Industry: Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 1985 Duke L.J. 1027 (1985)..,
17. 429 U.S. 610, 97 S. Ct. 861 (1977). In Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 89 S. Ct. 1252
(1969), the Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendants
United States Steel Corp. and United States Steel Homes Credit Corp., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of United States Steel. The facts were as follows: Plaintiff Fortner Enterprises
had obtained a two million dollar loan for the purchase of land from Home Credit in
exchange for Fortner's promise to buy prefabricated housing made by U.S. Steel. The
Supreme Court in Fortner I found that the trial court had incorrectly applied standards
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presumption is still valid: If the tying product is patented or copyrighted,
economic power is presumed to exist. 1 Justice O'Connor, however, in
her concurring opinion in Hyde,19 criticized the Hyde majority's ac-
ceptance of the Loew's presumption, stating that the "common mis-
conception . . . that a patent or copyright . . . suffices to demonstrate
market power" found no support in prior cases.20
The thesis of this article is that Justice O'Connor's criticism of the
Loew's presumption is well-founded: Market power should not be pre-
sumed from the existence of a patent or copyright on the tying product.
Prior to Fortner 1H, the Supreme Court and the lower courts were easily
convinced that the tying seller possessed market power in the tying
product. 2' In Fortner H and Hyde, the Court developed a more stringent
standard for the proof of economic power in a tying arrangement case.
In both of these cases, the Court, reversing lower court decisions for
the plaintiff, 22 determined that the tying seller did not have sufficient
economic power in the tying product to provide a basis for applying
the per se rule. 23 The Fortner H and Hyde opinions contain extensive
discussions of the nature of economic power and proof of its existence.2 4
The seller of a patented or copyrighted tying product does not, merely
by virtue of the patent or copyright, have economic power under the
for measuring two of the per se rule's elements, economic power and effect on commerce.
On remand after the reversal, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Fortner and
submitted the issue of damages to the jury. The court of appeals reversed the directed
verdict and remanded for a trial on the liability issue. 452 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919, 92 S. Ct. 1773 (1972). On remand the parties waived jury
trial and the trial judge, after hearing additional evidence, found for Fortner. The court
of appeals affirmed. 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975). In Fortner II, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding that the plaintiff had failed to
establish that the defendant had economic power in the tying product. 429 U.S. at 622,
97 S. Ct. 868.
18. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984); Fortner H, 429 U.S. at 619
and n.12, 97 S. Ct. at 867 and n.12.
19.. 466 U.S. at 32-47, 104 S. Ct. at 1569-76. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor in the separate opinion.
20. 466 U.S. at 37-38 n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 1571-72 n.7.
21. Pre-Fortner H proof of economic power is discussed at infra notes 67-75 and
accompanying text.
22. Fortner 11, 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding the trial court's finding that
the challenged tying arrangement was unlawful); Hyde, 513 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1981),
rev'd, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982). In Hyde the federal district court denied relief to
the plaintiff, but the court of appeals reversed, finding the challenged contract illegal per
se.
23. Fortner H, 429 U.S. 610, 617-20, 97 S. Ct. 861, 866-68 (1977); Hyde, 466 U.S.
at 26-29, 104 S. Ct. at 1565-67.
24. Id.
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guidelines set out by the Court in Fortner II and Hyde.2 5 Statements
of the presumption in Loew's and earlier Supreme Court cases are no
more than loose applications of an earlier patent law doctrine.
I. ECONOMIC POWER
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "not every refusal to
sell two products separately can be said to restrain competition. '2 6 If
the tying seller's tying product is a product which others will sell sep-
arately from the tied product, then buyers who want the tying product
but not the tied product will simply go to one of the other sellers. As
Justice Black stated in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,27
"[I1f one of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse to sell
flour unless the buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain
competition in sugar if its competitors were ready and able to sell flour
by itself."' 2 If a tying seller cannot effectively use the tying product to
pressure buyers into taking a second product, any restraint of trade
resulting from the attempted tie-in will be insignificant. 29 The "essential
characteristic" of an illegal tying arrangement is "forcing," or the seller's
"exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer
into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want
at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms."30
25. The Loew's presumption (or some aspect of it) is criticized in R. Posner, Antitrust
Law: An Economic Perspective 172 n.3 (1976); Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique
and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 88, 111-12; Bauer, supra note 12, at 333
n.179; Dam, supra note 12, at 19-20, 23 n.88, 28; Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner:
Comment on a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 39, 40-41 (1978); Lavey,
supra note 15, at 440-48; Lowin, Whether Patented or Unpatented: A Question of the
Economic Leverage of Patents to Coerce Tie-Ins, 23 IDEA 77, 102-06 (1982); Matheson,
Class Action Tying Cases: A Framework For Certification Decisions, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev.
855, 862 n.30, 872 n.71 (1982); Pearson, supra note 3, at 644; Singer, Market Power
and Tying Arrangements, 8 Antitrust Bull. 653, 660-62 (1963); Slawson, A Stronger,
Simpler Tie-In Doctrine, 25 Antitrust Bull. 671, 691 (1980); Note, The Presumption of
Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 1140 (1985); The Presumption of Market Power in Sales of Legally
Differentiated Tying Products, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1305 (1978); and Note, supra note 16,
at 1042-47.
The Justice Department has indicated in its Guidelines that it views rule of reason
analysis rather than per se analysis as being appropriate for restrictions "in licenses of
intellectual property (e.g., patent, a copyright, trade secret, and know-how)." Guidelines,
supra note 12, § 2.4.
26. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-12, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1558 (1984) (citing earlier Supreme
Court cases on this point).
27. 356 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 514 (1958).
28. Id. at 7, 78 S. Ct. at 519; quoted in Hyde, 466 U.S. at 12, 104 S. Ct. at 1558.
29. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6, 78 S. Ct. at 519.
30. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 12, 104 S. Ct. at 1558.
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If the tying seller does not have, with respect to the tying product, a
"special ability ... to force a purchaser to do something that he would
not do in a competitive market,"', buyers will simply refuse to buy the
tying product from that seller.3 2
The tying seller may lack the "special ability" to pressure buyers
into accepting the tie because the tying product (or an acceptable sub-
stitute).is available from other sellers, as in Justice Black's Northern
Pacific flour example, or because the tying product is not desired by
consumers. More specifically, the seller's "special ability" to bring about
forcing, called "market power" or "economic power," 33 is what econ-
omists refer to as "power over price," 34 or "the ability of a firm ...
to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales
so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be re-
scinded." 35 If buyer demand for the seller's version of the tying product
is such that buyers could be "forced" to pay the higher price for the
seller's product, then the seller may choose instead to force buyers to
accept a tying arrangement, thus preventing the buyers from exercising
independent judgment in the market for the tied product.3 6 In that event,
the "higher 'price" paid by the buyer is the purchase of a second product,
31. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 13-14, 104 S. Ct. at 1559.
32. Absent "forcing," buyers may of course still buy the two tied products from the
seller. In that event, competitors will be foreclosed from making the sale, but this
foreclosure will not be a concern of the antitrust laws. As one commentator has stated:
Any sale by one competitor forecloses his competitors to that extent, but such
foreclosure is of no concern unless accomplished by unfair advantage of some
sort. If a seller has no power over the tying product, if buyers can obtain the
precise equivalent from any one of a large number of other sellers, foreclosure
resulting from purchase of the package simply means that the buyers prefer
buying the package to buying separately, or else prefer the seller's tied product
"on the merits." The competing sellers deserve no protection against a wholly
uninhibited buyer's choice.
Turner, supra note 9, at 61.
Buyer acceptance of a tie-in does not indicate forcing or market power; buyers may
be simply exercising their own buying preferences when they accept the tie-in. In Hyde,
the court noted that buyers often find package sales attractive. 466 U.S. at 12, 104 S.
Ct. at 1558.
33. Hyde uses the term "market power," while Fortner H uses.the term "economic
power."
34. Another synonym is "monopoly power" in the sense of some amount of power
over price, without any implication of the amount of power. When the phrase "monopoly
power" is used in applications of section 2 of the Sherman. Act, there is an implication
that the power is large in amount. Slawson, supra note 25, at 673.
35. Landes and Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937,
937 (1981). In the language of economics, "market power" is the ability to set price
above marginal cost.
36. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-13, 104 S. Ct. at 1558 (1984).
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the "tied" product, that "the buyer either did not want at all, or might
have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms." 7" .
The "forcing" involved in an effective tie-in is, of course, not an
absolute coercion. A buyer faced with a seller's tying arrangement will
simply weigh his desire for the tying product against the price of the
tying and tied products. If the tied product is a product that the buyer
does not want or would prefer to get elsewhere, then the seller's re-
quirement that the buyer take the tied product represents a price increase
for the. desired tying product." Whether the seller chooses to use his
market power over the tying product to raise the dollar price of the
tying product or to impose a tie-in, the buyer's ultimate decision is the
same: Is the tying product worth the price?3 9
The Supreme Court has indicated that the seller's use of market
power to maximize the return on a product through a price increase is
not, by itself, unlawful. 40 However, if the seller, instead of using his
market power to exact a higher price for the tying product, uses the
market power to force some unwanted second product on buyers, then
free competition in the market for the second product is distorted and
restrained.4 1 As Justice Clark stated in Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States,42 "[Blasic to the faith that a free economy best promotes
the public weal is that goods must stand the cold test of competition.
43
37. Id. at 12, 104 S. Ct. at 1558.
38. As one commentator has stated, "[B]uyers evaluate tying arrangements as they
would any prospective purchase. Acceptance of the tie implies buyer satisfaction with
value." Note, The Presumption of Market Power in Sales of Legally Differentiated Tying
Products, supra note 25, at 1307.
39. As one commentator has stated:
The Court has consistently maintained that one of the evils of tying arrangements
is that "buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing prod-
ucts" in the tied market. On one level this statement is clearly nonsensical. In
principle, buyers always balance their desires for any product with its price.
With or without a tie-in, buyers can be forced to accept goods they prefer less
than others by the offering of a price differential which more than compensates
for the difference in attractiveness. Whatever the buyer regards as burdens of
the tie-in, whether low quality of the tied good, inability to deal with preferred
tied good sellers, or the risk inherent in being restricted to a given purchase in
advance, these burdens should be fully reflected in a decrease in what the buyer
will pay for the package.
Note, The Logic of Foreclosure, supra note 12, at 91 (footnote omitted). The author of
that Note takes the position that the Court's tie-in doctrine really stems from concern
with competitor foreclosure rather than concern with restraints on buyer freedom.
40. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 14, 104 S. Ct. at 1559. The Court's exact language is that
"the competitive ideal of the Sherman Act is not necessarily compromised" if the seller
uses his economic power to maximize his return on that product. Id.
41. Id. at 12, 104 S. Ct. at 1558.
42. 345 U.S. 594, 73 S. Ct. 872 (1953).
43. Id. at 605, 73 S. Ct. at 878; quoted in Hyde, 466 U.S. at 12-13, 104 S. Ct. at
1558.
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The particular evil of the tying arrangement is that the tying seller
"coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied'
product's merits and insulates [the tied product] from the competitive
stresses of the open market."" A potentially inferior tied product may,
because of the tie-in, sell better than superior substitutes. This deprives
existing or potential competitors of the opportunity of offering up their
goods to a test of free competitive judgment,4 5 deters potential com-
petitors from entering the market for the tied product,46 and deprives
consumers of the freedom to pick the best bargain in the tied product
market. 4
7
Some commentators, criticizing the Supreme Court's tying doctrine,
have taken the position that a seller possessing market power will rarely,
if acting rationally, attempt to impose a tie.4 8 A competitive seller selling
at the prevailing price and attempting to impose a tie will be displaced
by a seller who does not attempt a tie. 49 A seller with market power
who is charging a price which maximizes his return under applicable
market considerations cannot improve his position by tying: If he at-
tempts to impose a tie-in on his customers, then he will lose some
sales.50 The customers will treat the tie-in as an increase in the price
for the tying product, and the demand for that product will decline.'
Justice O'Connor expressed that point in her separate opinion concurring
in the judgment in Hyde, stating that
[t]he existence of a tied product normally does not increase the
profit that the seller with market power can extract from sales
of the tying product. A seller with a monopoly on flour, for
example, cannot increase the profit it can extract from flour
consumers simply by forcing them to buy sugar along with their
flour. Counterintuitive though that assertion may seem, it is
easily demonstrated and widely accepted.5 2
While the Court has viewed tying arrangements as a means for
extending market power from one market to another, 53 many commen-
44. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605, 73 S. Ct. at 878; Hyde, 466 U.S. at 13, 104
S. Ct. at 1558.
45. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 14, 104 S. Ct. at 1559.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 15, 104 S. Ct. at 1559-60.
48. See, e.g., R. Bork, supra note 3, at 372-73; Bowman, supra note 3, at 20-21;
Posner, supra note 3, at 508-09. For a summary of this viewpoint, see Butler, Lane &
Phillips, supra note 9, at 180-81.
49. Bowman, supra note 3, at 20-21.
50. Bowman, supra note 3, at 21. This view is summarized and then attacked in
Bauer, supra note 12, at 291-305.
51. Posner, supra note 3, at 508.
52. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1570 (1984).
53. Butler, Lane & Phillips, supra note 9, at 181.
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tators view leverage as an implausible motive for tie-ins . 4 Instead, they
view price discrimination or "metering" as the primary motivation for
tie-ins. 5 As one such commentator has stated, in the absence of price
discrimination, a monopolist will gain nothing from the tie-in; tying
does, however, enable the monopolist to practice price discrimination
by allowing the tying seller to monitor the extent of a buyer's use of
the tying product.16 The 1936 case of International Business Machines
Corp. v. United States57 is generally viewed as providing the classic
example of use of a tying arrangement as a metering device. In that
case, IBM sold computers, the monopolized tying product, at a relatively
low price. By requiring computer purchasers to use only IBM tabulating
cards in the computer, IBM could vary the overall charge for computing
according to the amount of the individual buyer's use of the computer."
Heavy users of the computer would, in effect, pay for their heavy use
by paying for more cards. By tying a second "counting product" to
the tying product, a seller can charge heavy users more than light users
for the tying product-price discrimination. 9 In Hyde, Justice O'Connor
stated that such tying arrangements may actually decrease the economic
costs of the tying seller's market powerA° The theory here is that if tie-
ins were not available, then the seller might charge all users a higher
price for the tying product, thus leading to a lower net usage of the
tying product and depriving buyers who do not place a high value on
the tying product of that product.6'
The price discrimination theory of tie-ins has had no impact on
antitrust policy, which has developed entirely from the Court's concern
with monopoly extension.6 2 The Supreme Court first used the term
''economic power" in a Sherman Act tying arrangement case in the
54. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 3, at 20; Posner, supra note 3, at 508. Butler,
Lane & Phillips, supra note 9, at 181 & n.46, summarizes the views of economists.
55. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 3, at 23-24; Posner, supra note 3, at 508-09;
Butler, Lane & Phillips, supra note 9, at 181 & n.49.
56. Posner, supra note 3, at 508. The price discrimination may be independently
unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982), which prohibits dis-
crimination in price between purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality where
the purchases are "in commerce" and the effect of the discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition. See generally F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-
Patman Act (1962).
57. 298 U.S. 131, 56 S. Ct. 701 (1936).
58. Posner, supra note 3, at 509. Butler, Lane & Phillips, supra note 9, at 191.
59. Bowman, supra note 3, at 23.
60. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 n.4, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1570-71 n.4 (1984). Justice O'Connor
cited three commentators in support of that statement.
61. See, e.g., R. Bork, supra note 3, at 398; Bauer, supra note 12, at 296 & n.42,
which restates and criticizes this theory. Posner believes that there is a substantial economic
basis for judicial hostility toward price discrimination. Posner, supra note 3, at 510.
62. Posner, supra note 3, at 509.
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1958 case of Northern Pacific Railway v. United States.63 In that case,
the Court stated that tying arrangements are "unreasonable in and of
themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect
to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
market for the tied product." 64 Market power "can be sufficient [to
bring the per se rule into play] even though the power falls far short
of dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to
some of the buyers in the market, '65 if the resulting effect on interstate
commerce is more than "insubstantial.' 6 The Court has never addressed
the question of how strong the seller's economic power -must be with
respect to those buyers who are susceptible to being forced. A seller
with economic power can raise his price for the tying product or, in
the alternative, impose a tie. The seller with only a slight degree of
economic power will only be able to impose a slight price increase (or
a minimally sacrificial tie-in to the buyer) before. losing sales so rapidly
that the price increase or tie-in is uiprofitable. The seller with a larger
amount of economic power will be able to impose a larger price increase
(or a more onerous tie-in) before losing sales.
As to evidence or proof of market power, several commentators
have noted that the Supreme Court, prior to the Fortner II decision,
was easily convinced of the existence of requisite market power. 67 The
Northern Pacific" case provides an example: In Northern Pacific the
63. 356 U.S. 1, 6, 78 S. Ct. 514, 518 (1958). In Northern Pacific, the Court, quoting
from Standard Oil Co. v. United States [hereinafter referred to as Standard Stations],
337 U.S. 293, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949), stated that "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any
purpose beyond the suppression of competition." Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6, 78 S.
Ct. at 518 (quoting from Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 305-06, 59 S. Ct. at 1058).
Compare that view of tying arrangements with the Department of Justice's view that tying
arrangements often serve procompetitive or competitively neutral purposes (such as the
seller's protection of a tying product's reputation) and generally do not have a significant
anticompetitive potential. Guidelines, supra note 12, § 5.1.
64. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6, 78 S. Ct. at 518.
65. Fortner 1, 394 U.S. 495, 503, 89 S. Ct. 1252, 1258 (1969). The Justice Department
has indicated that in its view the seller must have "dominance" (defined by Justice as
"a degree of market power that approaches monopoly proportions") for the tie-in to be
per se illegal. Guidelines, supra note 12, § 5.2 and n.35. Hyde states that "[i]f only a
single purchaser were forced with respect to the purchase of a tied item, the resultant
impact on competition would not be sufficient to warrant the concern of antitrust law."
466 U.S. 2, 16, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984).
66. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6, 104 S. Ct. at 518.
67. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 12, at 19; and Jones, supra note 25, at 40, who
stated that "[tlhe antitrust laws generally have required a measure of"economic power in
the tying product in order to find a violation. The problem has been the readiness of
the courts to accept almost any evidence as sufficient to show such power." Id. (footnote
omitted).
68. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1. 78 S. Ct. 514 (1957).
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government maintained that the defendant railroad's "preferential rout-
ing" clauses (requiring persons purchasing land from the railroad to
ship products grown or made on the land purchased from the railroad
over its rail lines) violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. In reviewing
the trial court's grant of summary judgment against the railroad, the
three dissenting Justices (Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker) contended
that the Court should have remanded the case to the trial court for
factual findings on the issue of the railroad's market power in the tying
product, the land. 69 According to the dissenting opinion, the trial court
had made no finding "that the [defendant] had a 'dominant position'
or . . . 'sufficient economic power,' in the relevant land market. ' 70 The
majority opinion, written by Justice Black, described the defendant's
land as "strategically located," shown by testimony and "common sense"
to be prized and "frequently essential" to the business activities of
prospective buyers, and found that it had been "established beyond any
genuine question that the defendant possessed substantial economic
power.""
The Loew's case, 2 decided four years after Northern Pacific, pro-
vides another example of the Couirt's readiness to find economic power.
In Loew's, the Court stated that while proof of "market dominance"-
defined by the Court as "some power to control price and to exclude
competition" 73-would establish economic power, economic power can
be-established without a direct showing of the seller's power over price.
Therefore, "[e]ven absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial
economic power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability
to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes. ' 74 As one writer has
stated, "[It would be difficult to conceive of any tying arrangement
which logically could not be.found to be illegal" under this "flexible"
Loew's test for economic power."1
In Fortner II and Hyde, both Supreme Court reversals of lower
court opinions holding that economic power had been demonstrated, 76
the Supreme Court tightened the test for market power, making it clear
that market power is power over price, or the seller's ability with respect
69. Id. at 13-20, 78 S. Ct. at 522-25.
70. Id. at 14, 78 S. Ct. at 523. As to the question of whether the majority in
Northern Pacific changed the "economic power" requirement from "dominance" to some
lower standard, see infra note 287.
71. 356 U.S. at 7, 78 S. Ct. at 519.
72. United States v. Loew's Inc.,.371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962).
73. Id. at 45, 83 S. Ct. at 102.
74. Id.
75. Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 Ohio St. L.J.
539, 547 (1968).
76. The citations to the Fortner H and Hyde lower court opinions appear at supra
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to the tying product to force customers to purchase a second, unwanted
product.77 In the view of the Supreme Court, neither the Fortner II
seller (U.S. Steel) nor the Hyde seller (a hospital) had this power.
In Fortner II, the buyer, Fortner Enterprises, had obtained a two
million dollar loan from United States Steel's financing subsidiary for
the purchase of land on the condition that Fortner develop the land
with prefabricated housing purchased from U.S. Steel.78 Fortner, in its
Sherman Act suit against U.S. Steel, maintained that U.S. Steel had
economic power with respect to the tying product, the loan, because
the terms of the loan which U.S. Steel offered Fortner were uniquely
advantageous and therefore highly desirable to Fortner.79 The Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's and Sixth Circuit's findings on the
economic power issue,80 stating that "[t]he unusual credit bargain offered
to [the buyer]" merely demonstrated U.S. Steel's "willingness to provide
cheap financing in order to sell expensive houses."'" According to the
Court, the Fortner plaintiff needed to show something more than the
uniquely desirable nature of U.S. Steel's loan offer; what was required
for a per se Sherman Act tying case was proof that U.S. Steel had a
unique product that its competitors were unable to offer.12 According
to Fortner II, product desirability establishes market power only if "other
competitors are in some way prevented from offering the distinctive
product themselves. '"83
The Fortner 11 plaintiff (buyer) had established economic power
under the flexible Loew's test. According to Loew's, no showing of
note 22.
77. See Fortner H, 429 U.S. 610, 620, 97 S. Ct. 861, 867 (1977) (stating that
the question is whether the seller has the "power ... to raise prices or to require
purchasers to accept burdensome terms"); and Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14, 104 S. Ct. 1551,
1559 (1984) (tying arrangements have been condemned when the seller has the 'power'
to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market").
78. Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 613-14, 97 S. Ct. 861, 864-65 (1977).
79. The uniquely advantageous features of the loan were as follows: The loan covered
one hundred percent of Fortner's projected cost for both the acquisition and development
of the real estate; U.S. Steel did not require any personal guarantees of the loan by
shareholders of Fortner Enterprises (a corporation); and the interest rate for the loan was
six percent, low under the then prevailing economic conditions. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at
616, 97 S. Ct. at 865-66.
80. Besides the unique desirability of the loan, the lower courts relied on three other
"propositions" to support a finding of economic power. The Supreme Court viewed the
other three propositions as insufficient to support the conclusion and disposed of them
with little discussion. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 614-16, 97 S. Ct. at 865-66.
81. 429 U.S. at 622, 97 S. Ct. at 868. The evidence indicated that U.S. Steel charged
Fortner a higher-than-competitive price for the prefabricated homes. Id. at 614, 97 S. Ct.
at 864-65.
82. Id. at 620-22, 97 S. Ct. at 867-69.
83. Id. at 621, 97 S. Ct. at 868 (quoting a Fortner I footnote, 394 U.S. 495, 505
n.2, 89 S. Ct. 1252, 1259 n.2 (1969)).
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market dominance is required to establish economic power; "economic
power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers
or from uniqueness in its attributes. ' s4 The Fortner II tying product,
the U.S. Steel loan, was both desirable to Fortner Enterprises, the buyer,
and unique in the sense of being unavailable from other lenders. In
Fortner II, the Court determined that uniqueness establishes an inference
of economic power only if there are barriers to prevent other sellers
from offering the unique product. 5 According to the Fortner H opinion,
earlier tying cases "focus[ed] attention on the question whether the seller
has the power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices
or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms [i.e., a tie-in] that
could not be exacted in a completely competitive market.''86 In order
to make the showing of economic power required for per se illegality,
the tying case plaintiff must do more than show that the seller's com-
petitors do not offer the tying product; the plaintiff must also show
that the seller's competitors are unable to offer the product. According
to the Court, the barriers to the competitors' duplication of the tying
product may be legal, physical, or economic.8 7
In Fortner II, the only possible barrier to competitors' duplication
of the tying product, a loan, was the economic barrier of cost advantage.
The Court indicated that there was no evidence that U.S. Steel had a
cost advantage over its competitors in the credit market. Thus, in the
view of the Court, there was no support for the lower courts' conclusions
that the plaintiff had met its burden of proving that U.S. Steel had
economic power in the tying market."s
In Hyde, decided seven years after Fortner II, the plaintiff, an
anesthesiologist, claimed that a hospital's exclusive contract with a par-
ticular firm of anesthesiologists was an illegal tying arrangement because
hospital patients who underwent surgery at the hospital had to use the
anesthesia services of the chosen firm. The trial court denied relief.s9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
84. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 83 S. Ct. 97, 102 (1962).
85. Fortner 11, 429 U.S. at 620-22, 97 S. Ct. at 867-69.
86. Id. at 620, 97 S. Ct. at 867.
87. Id. at 621, 97 S. Ct. at 868. This point was first stated by the Court in a
footnote to the Fortner I opinion, 394 U.S. 495, 505 n.2, 89 S. Ct. 1252, 1259 n.2 (1969).
The recent Eleventh Circuit decision of Tic-x-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815
F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1987) (reported at 52 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 856),
appears to comply with Fortner II's pronouncement on economic power. In that case the
defendants required those wanting to lease the only area enclosed arena to use their
computerized ticketing services. The court found that the tie violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
88. Fortner 11, 429 U.S. at 622, 97 S. Ct. at 869.
89. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1981).
19871
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol.48
finding the contract to be illegal per se.90 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari 9 and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding that the
plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendant hospital had economic
power with respect to the tying product, hospital services. 92
The Hyde plaintiff attempted to establish that the defendant-hospital
had economic power with respect to the tying product, hospital services,
through evidence of consumer preference for the hospital. 93 The consumer
preference shown was, in the words of the Court, "far from over-
whelming," ' 94 for in the time period studied, seventy percent of the local
residents needing hospitalization entered hospitals other than the defend-
ant hospital. 9 Furthermore, the Court concluded that there had been
no "forcing" of the tied product, anesthesia, on patients who would
have preferred to purchase anesthesia elsewhere, because consumers are
generally indifferent as to which certified anesthesiologist serves them. 96
In the view of the Court, the hospital did not have the "degree or the
kind of market power" 97 that makes forcing likely and per se prohibition
appropriate. 9  The Court in Hyde, before considering the plaintiff's
market power evidence, stated that market power can be established by
showing that the tying seller had been granted a patent "or similar
monopoly" over the tying product, by showing that the seller had a
large share of the tying product market, or by showing that the seller's
90. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
91. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 460 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 1271
(1983).
92. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 28-29, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1566-67 (1984). After concluding that
the record did not provide a basis for applying the per se rule, the Court also considered
the question of whether the challenged arrangement was illegal under a rule of reason
analysis and found that it was not. Id. at 29-32, 104 S. Ct. at 1567-68.
93. Id. at 26, 104 S. Ct. at 1565-66.
94. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 1566.
95. Id. at 26-27, 104 S. Ct. at 1566. The Fifth Circuit, acknowledging that the
hospital's market share alone was an insufficient basis for an inference of market power,
found additional support for its conclusion that market power existed by relying on
"market imperfections" in the hospital services product market (third-party payors and
imperfect information). 686 F.2d. at 290. The Supreme Court stated that "[wlhile these
factors may generate 'market power' in some abstract sense, they do not generate the
kind of market power that justifies condemnation of tying." 466 U.S. at 27, 104 S. Ct.
at 1566.
96. 466 U.S. at 28, 104 S. Ct. at 1566. Cf. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
444 F. Supp. 648, 674-75 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd in relevant part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.
1979), where the trial court found that the challenged tie-in could not be a per se Sherman
Act violation because the plaintiffs (buyers) were not forced to forego free choice in the
tied product because no competitors offered the tied product. The court concluded that
no commerce in the tied product market had been foreclosed.
97. 466 U.S. at 18, 104 S. Ct. at 1561.
98. Id. at 28-29, 104 S. Ct. at 1566-67.
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tying product is a unique product that competitors are unable to offer. 99
II. THE LoEw's PRESUMPTION
The Supreme Court's Fortner II and Hyde opinions make it clear
that under the current law, tying arrangements are per se illegal only
if the seller possesses "market power" in the sense of power over price.
In the 1962 Loew's case, 1°° the Court, while acknowledging that a tying
arrangement is per se illegal only if the seller has "sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product,"'' stated that this
required degree of economic power is presumed to exist when the tying
product is copyrighted or patented.1°2 In dicta in Fortner II and Hyde,
the Court indicated that the Loew's presumption is still valid.
99. 466 U.S. at 16-17, 104 S. Ct. at 1560-61. Presumably the Court's reference to
monopoly "similar" to a patent was a reference to copyright protection. One commentator,
however, has expressed the view that the Hyde Court, by omitting a specific reference
to copyright, may have been shifting away from past parallel treatment of patented and
copyrighted tying products. See W. Holmes, 1985 Antitrust Law Handbook, at 25-26.
As to market share, the Court has never stated what market share the seller must
possess for the existence of market power to be probable. In Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, the Court stated that the seller's market share, found by the court
to be forty percent, was insufficient to establish "that market 'dominance' which ...
would result" in a per se rule Sherman Act violation. 345 U.S. 594, 612-13, 73 S. Ct.
872, 882-83 (1953). The Department of Justice's Guidelines state that the Department will
not challenge the use of tying if the party imposing the tie has a market share of thirty
percent or less in the tying product market. If the seller's market share is over thirty
percent, the Department will attempt to determine whether the seller has "dominant"
market power. If the seller has dominant market power and the other elements for a per
se violation are present, the tie is per se illegal. Guidelines, supra note 12, § 5.3.
In the view of the Justice Department, under post-Hyde tying doctrine a tying ar-
rangement is per se illegal only if the seller has "dominant" market power in the tying
product market, defined in the Guidelines as "a degree of market power ... that
approaches monopoly proportions." Guidelines, supra note 12, § 5.3 n.35 (citing Hyde).
100. United States v. Loew's Inc,, 371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962).
101. Id. at 45, 83 S. Ct. at 102, (quoting from Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 6, 78 S. Ct. 514, 518 (1958)).
102. Id. The Loew's opinion cited two earlier Supreme Court decisions as supporting
that statement, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947),
and United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S. Ct. 915 (1948). There is
*no reference to the concept of economic power in either of these cases (see infra notes
217-312 and accompanying text). In International Salt, the Court, without referring to
the concept of economic power, found illegal the defendant's lease provisions requiring
lessees of the defendant's patented machines to use only the defendant's salt products.
In the Paramount case, the Court found the defendants' "block booking" of films to
be in violation of the Sherman Act, stating that a "refusal to license one or more
copyrights unless another copyright is accepted" is per se illegal. 334 U.S. at 159, 68 S.
Ct. at 930. The development of the Loew's presumption is discussed in text accompanying
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First, in Fortner II, the Court, discussing the trial court's erroneous
conclusion that economic power could be presumed from the unique
character of U.S. Steel's loan offer, reaffirmed the Loew's presumption
as follows:
The most significant finding made by the District Court related
to the unique character of credit extended to Fortner. This
finding is particularly important because the unique character
of the tying product has provided critical support for the finding
of illegality in prior cases. Thus, the statutory grant of a patent
monopoly in International Salt; the copyright monopolies in
Paramount and Loew's; and the extensive land holdings in
Northern Pacific represented tying products that the Court re-
garded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption of
economic power. 103
The Court in Hyde, discussing per se prohibition of tying arrangements,
reaffirmed the Loew's presumption by citing Loew's and stating that
"if the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly
over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product
elsewhere gives the seller market power."' 14 According to Hyde, "the
sale or lease of a patented item on condition that the buyer make all
his purchases of a separate tied product from the patentee is unlawful."'10 5
Thus, while a tying arrangement not involving a patented or copyrighted
tying product is per se illegal only on a showing that the seller has
power over price with respect to the tying product the plaintiff need
not prove that the seller has power over price where the tying product
is copyrighted or patented.1° Any tying arrangement involving a patented
infra notes 217-312.
The Justice Department, stating that its vertical restraints Guidelines "do not apply to
restrictions in licenses of intellectual property (e.g., patent, a copyright, trade secret, and
know-how)", takes the position that rule of reason analysis rather than per se treatment
is appropriate for such restrictions, because such restrictions "often are essential to ensure
that new technology realizes its maximum legitimate return and benefits consumers as
quickly and efficiently as possible." Guidelines, supra note 12, § 2.4. This position is
directly contrary to the Supreme Court's Loew's statements concerning patented and
copyrighted tying products.
103. Fortner 11, 429 U.S. 610, 619, 97 S. Ct. 861, 867 (1977) (citations and footnote
omitted, case names shortened).
104. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984).
105. Id. It is interesting to compare the Court's statement in Hyde with the Department
of Justice's statement in its Guidelines that restrictions in intellectual property licenses
"should not be condemned" unless they involve naked restraints of trade unrelated to
development of the intellectual property. Guidelines, supra note 12, § 2.4.
106. Again, it is interesting to compare the Supreme Court's view of tying arrangements
involving intellectual property-per se illegal, so long as there is a tie-in of two separate
products and an effect on commerce-with the Justice Department's Guidelines view-
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or copyrighted tying product will, because of this presumption operating
to the benefit of the plaintiff, be more easily found per se illegal than
will a tying arrangement involving a tying product that is not patented
or copyrighted. 0
7
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen-
eral Corp.108 provides an example of what one commentator called "[the]
harsh mechanical treatment of tie-ins"' 0 9 involving patented or copy-
such restrictions should be treated under the rule of reason, and possibly under a "more
lenient" than usual rule of reason approach, "because the anticompetitive risk and the
procompetitive benefits of restrictions in licenses are somewhat different from the potential
of typical vertical restraints." Guidelines, supra note 12, § 2.4.
Despite the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Loew's presumption in its most recent
tying cases, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the presumption in A.I.
Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986), stating that "the
pronouncement in Loew's [was] overbroad and inapposite" to Root, a case in which it
was alleged that the defendants had illegally tied desirable copyrighted software and less
desirable hardware. 806 F.2d at 676. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
summary judgment for the defendants. The district court opinion appears at 615 F. Supp.
727 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
107. Several commentators have recently expressed this sentiment, including Bauer,
supra note 12, at 333 n.179 (referring to "the harsh mechanical treatment of tie-ins
involving patented tying products"); Note, supra note 16, at 1033, 1045; and Note, supra
note 25, at 1311.
In post-Fortner cases not involving patented or copyrighted tying products, the plaintiff
has generally had a difficult time demonstrating that the seller has the required economic
power. See, e.g., Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3698 (1986); Jack Walters and Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg.,
Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984); Spartan Grain and Mill Co. v. Ayers, 735 F.2d 1284
(11th Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc denied without opinion, 741 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S. Ct. 785 (1985); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d
46 (2d Cir. 1980); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S. Ct. 59 (1980); and Spartan Grain and Mill
Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831, 100 S. Ct. 59
(1979).
Other recent tying arrangement cases include Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffart, Nos. 85-2780
and 85-2781 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 1986) (reported at 51 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 522) (trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on tying
counterclaim affirmed); Microbyte Corp. v. New Jersey State Golf Ass'n., No. 84-949
(D.N.J. June 25, 1986) (reported at 51 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 8) (granting
the plaintiff, developer of a computer system for golf tournaments, summary judgment
on the questions of whether state golf associations tied participation in golf tournaments
to the use of a national association's computer handicapping service and whether a
substantial amount of commerce was affected); and S. Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., No. M-83-122 (M.D.N.C. April 22, 1986) (reported at 50 Antitrust and
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 829) (denying defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. after a
jury verdict of $300,000 in Sherman Act actual damages for plaintiff).
108. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1984). The case is
discussed and criticized in Note, supra note 16.
109. Bauer, supra note 12, at 333 n.279.
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righted tying products. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that defendant
Data General's refuisal to license its popular copyrighted computer soft-
ware to customers who refused to purchase Data General's less popular
hardware was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
was also a violation of the Clayton Act." 0 The procedural history of
Data General is complicated. Although the jury had found that Data
General possessed sufficient economic power in the software market to
restrain competition appreciably in the hardware market, the trial court
granted Data General's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's factual finding."' The court of appeals reversed, finding ample
evidence to support the jury's verdict." 2 In discussing the adequacy of
the evidence, the Ninth Circuit observed that the defendant's tying
software was copyrighted and quoted the Loew's presumption," 3 noting
that the presumption had been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court both
in Fortner II and in Hyde." 4 While the copyright presumption was not
the only basis for the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the Data General trial
court's judgment n.o.v., the presumption clearly played a key role in
the decision." 5
Presumptions can be conclusive or rebuttable. If a presumption is
conclusive, as McCormick has stated, "when fact B is proven, fact A
110. 734 F.2d at 1338.
111. 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The jury trial was limited to the economic
power issue, the trial court having previously, on the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, found that there was no question as to the existence of the other elements of
tying arrangement per se illegality. In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp.
1089, 1104-07, 1116-17 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd in relevant part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1984).
112. 734 F.2d at 1344.
113. Id. at 1341.
114. Id. at 1341-42.
115. In finding sufficient evidence of economic power, the court of appeals also focused
on the desirability of Data General's software and on the fact that many of the buyers,
"original equipment manufacturers," were "locked in" to the use of Data General's
software once they constructed their applications software for their equipment. 734 F.2d
at 1341. One commentator has criticized the Ninth Circuit's "lock-in" theory, finding it
circular. See Note, supra note 16, at 1041. The Ninth Circuit's "lock-in" theory is also
discussed in Helein, Software Lock-In and Antitrust Tying Arrangements: The Lessons
of Data General, 5 Computer L.J. 329 (1985).
The trial court rejected Data General's business justification defenses, 490 F. Supp. at
1120-24, and the Ninth Circuit agreed with trial court's ruling on that point. 734 F.2d
at 1339 n.l. Business justification is discussed at supra note 12.
The Sixth Circuit in its decision in A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806
F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986), discussed at supra note 106, distinguished Data General on the
facts, stating that in Data General the tying product was unique and desirable as well as
copyrighted, while in Root the tying product was not unique or desirable. 806 F.2d at
677.
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must be taken as true, and the adversary is not allowed to dispute
[that]. 1 6 A rebuttable presumption will get the party for whose benefit
the presumption operates-usually the plaintiff, since the plaintiff gen-
erally has the burden of producing evidence on issues other than af-
firmative defenses-past the opponent's motion for directed verdict and
will even carry the burden of persuasion, should the opponent fail to
introduce rebuttal evidence. If the opposing party presents rebuttal evi-
dence, a question arises as to whether the presumption has shifted the
burden of persuasion on the issue to the adversary or shifted only the
burden of producing evidence. Under the "Thayer" or "bursting bubble"
view of rebuttable presumptions, the only effect of a rebuttable pre-
sumption is to shift to the opponent (generally to the defendant) the
burden of producing evidence with regard to the presumed fact. The
opponent's production of rebuttal evidence "bursts" the presumption,
and the presumption disappears, leaving the question of the formerly
presumed fact's existence to the jury, and leaving the burden of per-
suasion where it was originally, generally on the plaintiff." 7 Under the
other view, the rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of persuasion
on the given issue to the opponent: Once the fact giving rise to the
rebuttable presumption has been established, the party against whom
the presumption operates has the burden of presenting sufficient counter-
evidence to overcome the presumption." 8
The Supreme Court has never clearly indicated whether the Loew's
presumption is conclusive, rebuttable in the "bursting bubble" sense of
shifting only the burden of producing evidence to the defendant, or
rebuttable in the sense of shifting to the defendant the burden of
persuasion as to the nonexistence of economic power. As any antitrust
trial attorney knows, presumptions often play a key role in the trial of
antitrust cases; the question of which variety of presumption is involved
can be crucial." 9 If the Loew's presumption is conclusive, then a tying
case plaintiff, on proving that the defendant's tying product is copy-
righted or patented, has satisfied the economic power requirement for
116. Cleary, McCormick On Evidence § 342, at 966 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). This
sort of "presumption" is really a rule of law: If fact A is to be conclusively presumed
from fact B's existence, proof of fact A is really immaterial for the purpose of the
plaintiff's case. All that is required is proof of fact B.
117. Id. at § 344.
118. Id.
119. The initial concern of an antitrust plaintiff's attorney, of course, will be that of
surviving the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Northwest Wholesale Sta-
tioners, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985),
discussed in Brunet & Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance After
Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of
Proof, and Boycotts, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1015 (1986).
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C)
per se illegality, leaving only the de minimus "commerce requirement"
and "two product tie-in" requirements to be satisfied to establish a
Sherman Act violation.120
In Loew's, the Court, after stating that "[tihe requisite economic
power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted,"''
stated that "[tihere may be rare circumstances in which the doctrine we
have enunciated under § I of the Sherman Act prohibiting tying ar-
rangements involving patented or copyrighted tying products is inappl-
icable.' ' 2 2 The Loew's Court may have been indicating with that language
that the presumption is rebuttable rather than conclusive. On the other
hand, the Court may have been indicating that under rare circumstances
an otherwise per se illegal tying arrangement by a seller with economic
power would be deemed reasonable and lawful because of a business
justification defense.12 The Fortner II and Hyde opinions do not indicate
whether the presumption is rebuttable or conclusive. 24 The absolute
nature of Hyde's language-"the sale or lease of a patented item on
condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied product
from the patentee is unlawful"' 25-seems to hint at a conclusive pre-
sumption. 126 In Data General, both the trial court and the appellate
120. See infra notes 1-25 and accompanying text.
121. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 83 S. Ct. 97, 102 (1962).
122. Id. at 49-50, 83 S. Ct. at 104.
123. See supra note 12.
124. See Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 620, 97 S. Ct. 861, 867-68 (1977); and Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 16, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984).
125. 466 U.S. at 16, 104 S. Ct. at 1560 (emphasis added).
126. If the presumption is conclusive, then proof of a patent or copyright on the
tying product would conclusively establish economic power (subject to a possible business
justification or goodwill defense, see supra note 12).
For lower court cases that appear to view the presumption as being conclusive, see Rex
Chainbelt Inc. v. Harco Prods. Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 831, 96 S. Ct. 52 (1975) (stating that the seller had exercised the market power
"attendant to" its patented tying product); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444
F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S. Ct. 666 (1980); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron
Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 61 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (stating that "as a matter of law, [the tying
seller] had sufficient economic power in the market of its tying product, its patented
process, to restrain to an appreciable extent competition in the markets of the tied
products"); and Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D.
Ill. 1965), aff'd, 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 395 U.S.
100, 89 S. Ct. 1562 (1969). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, appears to have rejected
the presumption. See A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th
Cir. 1986).
See generally W. Holmes, supra note 12, § 20.02, at 20-5 to 20-6 n.30; 12A Business
Organizations, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 10.01[2] (1986); Bowman, supra note 3, at 31
("When the sale or lease of a commodity is tied to a patented product, the tie-in is
considered per se illegal. No exceptions to the rule have emerged ... and indeed it
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court viewed the presumption as rebuttable. 27
If the presumption is rebuttable, the question is whether the pre-
sumption (1) "bursts" on the defendant's introduction of counter-evi-
dence of economic power; or (2) shifts the burden of persuasion as to
lack of economic power to the defendant. The Federal Rules of Evidence
have adopted the "bursting bubble" theory for actions "not otherwise
provided for by Act of Congress" or by the Federal Rules. 28 If the
presumption is a "bursting bubble" rebuttable presumption and the
defendant introduces evidence of its lack of market power in the tying
product, then the jury must decide whether the plaintiff has met its
burden of persuasion as to the existence of economic power. 129 The only
comment in the Loew's opinion that could be relevant on the question
of whether the Loew's court viewed the presumption as rebuttable in
the former or latter sense is the Court's statement that it is "difficult
to conceive" of a case involving those "rare circumstances"' 30 in which
economic power should not be presumed for a copyrighted or patented
tying product. This comment is possibly an indicator that where a
copyrighted or patented tying product is involved, the court viewed the
burden of persuasion as to the non-existence of economic power as
being on the defendant.
In Data General, the trial court apparently viewed the Loew's pre-
sumption as shifting to the defendant merely the burden of producing
acceptance may be gauged by the fact that no defendant has even questioned the doctrine
in recent years." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)); and Lavey, supra note 15, at 444
(stating that in Loew's, the Court "came close to announcing a conclusive presumption").
127. 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (stating that the trier of fact must
"take note of material facts in the record which may rebut the presumption"); 529 F.
Supp. 801, 811 (N.D. Cal. 1981); 734 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473
U.S. 908, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
One commentator has stated that in Data General the Ninth Circuit put so much
emphasis on the existence of copyright on the tying product that the presumption of
market power "was effectively rendered conclusive." Note, supra note 16, at 1044. See
also W. Holmes, supra note 12, § 20.02 (presumption of market power is, in theory,
rebuttable, but courts that have considered the legality of patent tie-ins have found
economic power with little analysis of market conditions).
128. Fed. R. Evid. 301.
129. The defendant's counter-evidence might include evidence that the tying product,
even though patented or copyrighted, is not desirable or that the tying product industry
is highly competitive, offering many substitutes for the defendant's version of the tying
product. The relevance of product desirability is discussed at infra notes 141-159 and
accompanying text; and the relevance of substitutes for a copyrighted or patented tying
product is discussed at infra notes 160-204 and accompanying text.
If a copyright-based or patent-based presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to
the defendant, then the defendant, in order to negate the inference of economic power
raised by the presumption, must convince the jury by a preponderance of evidence that
he lacks economic power in the tying product.
130. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49-50, 83 S. Ct. 97, 104 (1962).
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evidence as to its lack of economic power in the tying product, software.
The trial judge, in his opinion granting a judgment n.o.v. for the
defendants, stated that in submitting the economic power issue to the
jury, he had "explained that copyright protection is presumed to con-
stitute [a legal barrier to product duplication] and that the burden is
on defendant to rebut that presumption by proving that its copyrights
have not prevented others from developing the distinctive product them-
selves."'' He found the evidence of economic power to be insufficient
to support the jury decision for the plaintiff, and stated that "no
reasonable jury could find that the defendant possessed sufficient eco-
nomic power in the relevant tying product market appreciably to restrain
competition in the relevant tied product market."'3 This comment may
reflect the judge's view that the presumption disappeared once the
defendant introduced rebuttal evidence.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, may have viewed the Loew's
presumption as imposing on Data General, the defendant, the burden
of persuasion as to the non-existence of economic power-a view in-
consistent with the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions adopted
in the Federal Rules of Evidence.' According to the Ninth Circuit, the
trial judge in his review of the evidence actually "erroneously imposed
the burden of proof" as to the defendant's possession of economic
power on the plaintiff. 3 4 The appellate court viewed the copyright on
the software as creating "a presumption of economic power sufficient
to render the tying arrangement illegal per se. The burden to rebut the
presumption shifted to defendant."' 3 5 At trial, Data General had intro-
duced evidence of its lack of market power, including evidence that the
computer market was highly competitive, that substitutes for the tying
product were available, that Data General's software competed with
more than one hundred other brands of software, and that Data Gen-
eral's pricing was competitive rather than monopolistic pricing. 3 6 Ap-
parently the trial judge viewed this counter-evidence as rebutting the
copyright-based presumption of economic power. The Ninth Circuit,
with only a cursory examination of the rebuttal evidence, 3 7 reversed the
131. In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801, 811 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(granting defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.).
132. Id. at 814.
133. Fed. R. Evid. 301.
134. Digidyne Corp.. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 473 U.S. 908, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
135. Id. (footnote omitted).
136. 529 F. Supp. at 813-16.
137. 734 F.2d at 1345-46. The handling of the presumption by the Ninth Circuit is
criticized in Note, supra note 16, stating that "under the Ninth Circuit's view of the
[economic power] issue, it is difficult to see how even the smallest computer manufacturer




trial court's judgment n.o.v., stating that it was "evident that there was
ample direct and circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict" 3
for the plaintiff on the issue of economic power.
Whether the Loew's presumption is conclusive, rebuttable in the
"bursting bubble" sense, or rebuttable in the sense of shifting the burden
of persuasion to the defendant, the presumption is consistent with the
Court's current view of tying arrangement per se illegality only if, in
general, the fact that the tying product is copyrighted or patented
indicates that the seller is likely to be able to use the product to force
buyers to accept a tie-in. The Court's validation of the Loew's pre-
sumption in Fortner II and Hyde'19 is surprising, for the fact that a
tying product is patented or copyrighted is no indication that the prod-
uct's seller is likely to have economic power. The Court's explanations
for the presumption in Fortner II and in Hyde are unconvincing and
are based on an incorrect understanding of the true nature of copyright
and patent rights. 14°
One major flaw in the Loew's presumption can be recognized without
even delving into copyright and patent law. In order to provide a basis
for economic power (to give the seller the possibility of imposing a
higher price, or, in the alternative, a tie-in), a product must be desired
by potential buyers. Absent product desirability, the seller will not be
able to impose a tie; the seller will not be able to use the tying product
to pressure potential buyers into accepting the tied product if the buyers
do not want the tying product. The fact that a tying product is patented
or copyrighted does not indicate that the product is desirable to potential
buyers. Neither product desirability nor likelihood of commercial success
is a requirement for the grant of a patent or for the establishment of
138. 734 F.2d at 1346. In two recent decisions involving tying arrangements with
copyrighted software tying products, federal district court judges granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had not raised a disputed issue of fact
on the question of the defendant's economic power. See A.I. Root Co. v. Computer
Dynamics, Inc., 615 F. Supp 727 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986);
and 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp;, 591 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Mich. 1984). In 3 P.M.
the court, relying on the Data General district court opinion, took the position that the
existence of copyright has not been held sufficient to prove economic power. 591 F.
Supp. at 1357. The Root district court, citing 3 P.M., rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the copyright on the tying product established product uniqueness. 615 F. Supp. at
732. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that a presumption of economic power "is not
warranted merely by existence of a copyright or patent." 806 F.2d at 676.
139. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
140. Obviously, if the presumption lacks validity the injustice created by use of the
presumption is most severe if the presumption is conclusive and least severe if the
presumption merely shifts to the defendant the burden of going forward and not the
burden of persuasion.
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copyright protection. 4 1 The grant of a patent on a product or estab-
lishment of copyright protection does not, in and of itself, create demand
for the product.142 A patented or copyrighted tying product may or may
not be desirable, just as any other product may or may not be desirable.
The Loew's case itself 43 provides an illustration of this point. In
Loew's, the government challenged six major motion picture distributors'
141. The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "[tlo
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Congress first exercised that power many years ago, enacting the first patent and
copyright statutes in 1790. Since that time, the patent laws have been revised three times
and the copyright laws four times. The provisions of the current patent law began at 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The provisions of the current Copyright Act began at 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1982).
To qualify for a patent, a patent application must be filed showing the product or
process for which the patent is sought to be new, useful, and non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. §
101 (1982). The patentee gets the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the patented
invention for a period of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 1154 (1982). The patent term is
nonrenewable. At the end of the term, anyone can make, use, or sell the device. A patent
is given in exchange for the full disclosure to the public of the new invention. The patent
specifications filed as part of the patent application must reveal how the invention works
and how to make the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
Copyright protection exists for original works of authorship that are recorded in some
tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (1982). The copyright protection, according to the
current copyright law, arises as soon as the work is fixed in a tangible medium. Id. The
copyright holder has the exclusive right to reproduce ("copy") the work, to distribute
copies of it, to prepare derivative works, and to perform and display the work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (1982). The copyright protection lasts for fifty years beyond the date of the author's
death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). The creation of copyright protection, unlike patent
protection, does not require government approval or the prior filing of an application or
registration. Federal registration is required, however, to preserve certain remedies and as
a prerequisite to an infringement suit. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(a), 411(a), 412 (1982). The
copyright protection that arises on creation of the work is preserved for the author by
placing a notice of copyright (the word "copyright," abbreviation "copr.," or symbol
"C": name of copyright owner; and date of first publication) on any publicly distributed
copy of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982). Failure to affix the notice does not necessarily
mean a forfeiture of copyright protection, since the Copyright Act contains "cure"
provisions. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1982). A good faith infringer who infringes a copyright
on a work for which copyright notice was omitted has no liability for any damages for
infringement before his receipt of actual notice of federal copyright registration of the
work. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1982).
142. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that a patented tying product may or
may not be desirable in Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 914 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 1504 (1979), where the court stated that "[a]bsent demand
for a product ... there can be no commercial success. No patent can itself create market
demand. A patent of the unwanted is worthless." Three commentators have expressed
that same view, Austin, supra note 25, at 112; Turner, supra note 9, at 53; and Note,
supra note 25, at 1150.
143. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962).
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practice of "block booking" films. The distributors allowed television
stations to buy films only in packages. A station, in order to get a
highly desired film, had to accept less desirable films as well.'" The
trial court found that the defendants' block booking practice had all
the elements of a per se illegal tying arrangement. 45 The Supreme Court
agreed,146 repeating the trial judge's observation that "forcing a television
station which wants 'Gone with the Wind' to take 'Getting Gertie's
Garter' as well is taking undue advantage of the fact that . . . there is
but one 'Gone with the Wind.""11 47 The Court recognized that tying
arrangements violate the Sherman Act only if the seller has economic
power in the tying product, 48 but stated that "economic power may be
inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from
uniqueness of its attributes" and "is presumed when the tying product
is patented or copyrighted."' 4 9
Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court in Loew's divided the
defendants' films into tying products and tied products.' 0 If, however,
"Gone with the Wind" is viewed as the tying product and "Getting Ger-
tie's Garter" as the tied product, a conclusion that a film distributor sell-
ing those two films as a package possessed sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to bring the per se rule into play is probably
correct. Because television station owners wanted "Gone with the Wind,"
a distributor would be able to force them to take "Getting Gertie's Garter"
as well.'' No one would suggest, however, that the Loew's distributors
could have forced a station owner who did not want "Gone with the
Wind" to take "Gone with the Wind" by refusing to sell the station owner
"Getting Gertie's Garter," another undesirable film, without "Gone with
the Wind." Although the film "Getting Gertie's Garter" is, like "Gone
with the Wind," copyrighted, the undesirable copyrighted film would not
provide the seller with a basis for forcing buyers to take some second,
also unwanted, tied film.' 2
144. Id. at 40-43, 83 S. Ct. at 99-101.
145. 189 F. Supp. 373, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
146. 371 U.S. at 52, 83 S. Ct. at 105. The Court modified the trial judge's injunction
against block booking. Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred, agreeing with the majority
on all points other than the majority's "trivial remedial glosses" on the trial court's
decree. Id. at 56, 83 S. Ct. at 108.
147. Id. at 48 n.6, 83 S. Ct. at 104 n.6.
148. Id. at 45, 83 S. Ct. at 102.
149. Id.
150. The film packages varied in size.
151. The defendants argued that television stations, unlike movie theaters, had no
great desire to get any particular film, since they were buying films for a tiny portion
of programming time directed at a small late-night audience. The Court rejected that
argument. 371 U.S. at 47-48, 83 S. Ct. at 103-04.
152. The commentator Lowin provided a patent law example of this premise:
19871.
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The key to the Loew's distributors' success in getting television
stations to buy film packages was that some of the films were desirable,
not that the films were copyrighted."' Some patented and copyrighted
products are popular with consumers, while others are not. If there is
to be a presumption of economic power for patented or copyrighted
tying products, an initial inquiry must be made concerning the product:
Is the patented or copyrighted item desirable? Some commentators 5 4
and some lower courts' have, in fact, viewed the Loew's presumption
What about a combination toothpick-hairbrush-mop-hammer-knife-and desk lamp?
Assuming that the requisite utility, novelty, unobviousness, and invention had
been proven [for patentability] and that a patent had been granted on it, would
the holder of this unique patent have the power to coerce any buyer to accept
a tie-in? Regardless of its uniqueness and patented status, such an item does
not possess great economic leverage.
Lowin, supra note 25, at 105.
Of course, if a patented or copyrighted tying product is truly undesirable, the attempted
tie-in probably would not have even the minimal effect on commerce required for a per
se section 1 violation.
153. One commentator has stated that the reason for the package sales was the
distributors' desire to maximize revenues over sales to buyers who valued different films
differently. See Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963
Sup. Ct. Rev. 152. Another commentator has noted that if the uniqueness of a copyright
really conferred economic power, there would never be a need to tie one copyrighted
item to another copyrighted item-each copyrighted item would be a base for a seller's
economic power. Lowin, supra note 25, at 104.
154. E.g., Austin, supra note 25, at 112.
155. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir.
1974), stating that the presumption of economic power in Loew's arose not just from
the copyright on the tying products but from "the attractiveness of some of the films,
as contrasted to the inferior quality of the others also required to be purchased." The
trial court in Data General quoted that portion of the Capital Temporaries opinion in
support of its statement that "[n]otwithstanding implied suggestions to the contrary, the
sole fact of the existence of a copyright notice has not been held ... sufficient to prove
economic power." In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1112 (N.D.
Cal. 1980), rev'd, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908, 105 S. Ct. 3534
(1984). The trial court concluded that the question of whether Data General had economic
power in the copyrighted tying software could not be resolved without inquiry into product
desirability at a trial on that issue. 490 F. Supp. at 1113. For purposes of ruling on
Data General's motion for a judgment n.o.v., the trial court assumed the tying product
to be uniquely desirable. 529 F. Supp. 801, 815 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The Ninth Circuit
found that there was abundant evidence that the defendant's software was desirable.
Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984).
Cf. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), where the court indicated,
after quoting the Loew's statement of the copyright presumption, that the "value of the
patent, copyright or trademark is . . . directly proportionate to the consumer desirability
of the protected product." 332 F.2d at 513. Judges Friendly and Medina, "[c]oncurring
with most" of the Susser majority opinion, added that "[w]hatever has been said about
the evils of 'ties' to patented or copyrighted items is meaningful only in the situation
where the desirability of the patented item is what motivates the purchaser to make further
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as involving a "desirability" component, restating the presumption in
this manner (to paraphrase): Economic power is to be presumed from
the existence of copyright or patent protection on a desirable tying
product. The obvious response to that view is that the Court did not
so state the presumption in Loew's and did not so restate the presumption
in the Hyde or Fortner II dicta. On the other hand, even a first-year
law student could point out that the Loew's opinion's abstract legal
principle-economic power is to be presumed from the tying product's
patent or copyright-is binding precedent only in the context of the
Loew's facts, where, as to some of the films, tying product desirability
did exist. 5 6 At the Supreme Court level, the Loew's defendants phrased
the issue concerning the economic power presumption in a form that
did not involve any inquiry as to tying product desirability. 5 7 The Loew's
Court did discuss product desirability, but only in response to the
defendants' argument that since television stations viewed all films as
being interchangeable, stations did not desire any particular films but
were merely buying films to fill late-night time.'58 The Court rejected
commitments or to give up some liberty of choice as to other products." 332 F.2d at
519 (emphasis added).
See also A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676-77 (6th Cir.
1986), Where the court, citing Justice O'Connor's Hyde concurrence, rejected the pre-
sumption and characterized the Data General tying product as unique and desirable; and
3 P.M. Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1984), where
the court, citing Capital Temporaries and Data General, stated that copyright alone does
not establish economic power.
156. Cf. United States v. Loew's Inc., 189 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The Loew's
trial court considered and rejected the defendant's argument that block booking (found
illegal earlier in Paramount, discussed in infra notes 217-312 and accompanying text) may
or may not be illegal depending on the setting: "It has been urged that the only antitrust
action which specifically declared block-booking to be illegal was the Paramount case and
that this decision was rendered in-the setting of the particular case, involving as it did
the broad area of monopoly and unfair practices." 189 F. Supp. at 379. The defendants
sought to have the Court distinguish, on a factual basis, the sale of movies for theater
showing and sale of movies for television showing. 371 U.S. at 47, 83 S. Ct. at 103.
157. The first "Question Presented" stated in Loew's Inc.'s Jurisdictional Statement
filed with the Supreme Court was as follows:
Whether the legal requirement that dominance or sufficient economic power in
the relevant market must exist to establish a "tying agreement" violative of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is automatically satisfied by the mere fact that
products distributed in that market are copyrighted, despite factual findings that
no defendant has market dominance and that there existed intense competition
in the relevant market.
Brief for the Appellants Loew's Inc., Associated Artists Productions, Inc., and United
Artists Corp. at 3, United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962) (in
10 P. Kurland and G. Casper, Antitrust Law: Major Briefs and Oral Arguments of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 Term-1975 Term 25, 30 (1979)).
158. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47, 83 S. Ct. 97, 103 (1962).
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that argument with reference to the trial judge's finding that the television
market did not view films as interchangeable.5 9
Even if the application of the Loew's presumption is restricted to
desirable copyrighted or patented tying products, the presumption is
flawed. For the presumption (with the added "product desirability"
component) to be valid, the presence of a patent or copyright on a
desirable tying product should indicate that the product's seller is likely
to have economic power with respect to that product. The seller of a
patented or copyrighted product has, based on the patent or the co-
pyright, certain rights to exclude competitors from duplicating the pro-
tected product. In Fortner I, Fortner II, and Hyde, the Court attempted
to justify the Loew's presumption on the basis of the patent and co-
pyright exclusionary rights. In Hyde, the Court, after stating that per
se prohibition of a tying arrangement is appropriate only if anticom-
petitive forcing is likely, stated that "if the Government has granted
the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to
presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller
market power."' 60 In Fortner I and Fortner II, the Court, after stating
that product "[ulniqueness confers economic power only when other
competitors are in some way prevented from offering the distinctive
product themselves," referred to legal "barriers" that prevent compet-
itors from offering the product, "as in the case of patented and co-
pyrighted products."' 6'
The Court's "exclusionary rights" explanation of the Loew's pre-
sumption is based on an exaggeration of the extent to which intellectual
property protection provides insulation from competitors' development
and sale of substitutes for the tying seller's product. If the tying seller
has a desirable tying product, then a true lack of acceptable substitutes
would enable the seller to "force" buyers to (in the alternative) pay a
higher price for the tying product or accept a tie-in. If the patent or
copyright exclusionary rights truly prevented the tying seller's competitors
from offering a product that consumers would accept as a substitute
product, then the Loew's presumption, as applied to desirable tying
products, would make sense. The fact that the desirable tying product
was copyrighted or patented would indicate that the tying seller was
able to charge a higher price for the desirable product or force a tie-
in on buyers, because competitors would be unable to mimic the tying
seller's desirable product. Neither the patent nor the copyright exclu-
sionary rights are that expansive, however.
159. 371 U.S. at 48, 83 S. Ct. at 103. The trial judge found each film to be a unique
product. 189 F. Supp. at 381. Uniqueness, however, is not the same as desirability.
160. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984) (citation omitted).
161. Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 621, 97 S. Ct. 861, 868 (1977); Fortner I, 394 U.S.
495, 505 n.2, 89 S. Ct. 1252, 1259 n.2 (1969).
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As to patents, the patentee has the exclusive right to make, use, or
sell the patented invention for the term of the patent, seventeen years.162
One who makes, uses, or sells the patented invention without author-
ization from the patentee infringes the patent and is liable for damages. 163
The crucial question in a patent infringement suit is this: Does the
allegedly infringing device, whether copied from the patented device or
independently created, do the same work, in substantially the same way,
and accomplish substantially the same result as the patented product?164
Where economic power is concerned, however, the proper inquiry is not
the patent infringement case question of whether there is a legal barrier
that prevents the tying seller's competitors from offering a product that
does substantially the same work in substantially the same way as the
tying product. The proper tying case inquiry is whether the tying seller's
competitors are, by virtue of the patent, prevented from offering products
that are functionally equivalent to the tying product.165 If the seller of
a desirable patented tying product seeks to exact a higher price for that
product in the form of a tie-in, potential buyers who have the option
of switching to another seller's "untied" functionally equivalent product
would presumably do so. Consumer price sensitivity is determined in
part by the availability of suitable substitutes. A patent does not protect
the patentee from competition of functionally equivalent products 66 (i.e.,
those that do substantially the same work and accomplish substantially
the same result, but in something less than substantially the same way
that the patented product does that work or accomplishes that result).
An idea itself is not patentable. 167 There are, for example, a number
162. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
163. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1983). See generally Milgrim, supra note 126, § 9.02[5]; and
D. Chisum, Patents § 16.02 (1986).
164. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). A determination
of patent infringement is a two-step process. First the patent claims (statements defining
what is covered in the patent) are examined. Then the allegedly infringing device is
examined to see if the patent claims substantially describe that device.
Independent creation of the infringing device is not a defense in a patent infringement
action. An unlawful infringement may be entirely unintentional. D. Chisum, supra note
163, § 16.02 (citing Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881)).
165. As one commentator has expressed this point, "[Tlhe relevant barrier to entry
[in determining whether economic power exists] is not the prohibition against unauthorized
use or duplication, but the inability of competitors to introduce successful product var-
iants." Note, supra note 25, at 1313.
166. Other commentators have made this point, including Bauer, supra note 12, at
333 n.179; Singer, supra note 25, at 661; and Lavey, supra note 15, at 437 n.15, 438.
167. A patent does not allow the patentee to take the idea, mental process, or abstract
intellectual process involved in his process or invention, for these "are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S. Ct.
253, 255 (1972); accord, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1056
(1981); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S. Ct. 440,
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of microwave ovens presently on the market, all patented. Not only
does the patent not protect the patentee against competitors' sales of
functionally equivalent products, competitors are free to "invent
around"' 68 a patent, and, in the case of a desirable tying product, would
have clear economic incentive to do so.
A patent holder possesses, by virtue of his patent exclusionary rights,
control of the production and sale of his product, just as the fee simple
owner of a piece of land controls the sale of the land. 69 The Supreme
Court and lower courts have, over the years, referred to the patent-
based product control rights as a "statutory monopoly."' 17 The patent
"statutory monopoly" should not be confused with a market-wide mo-
nopoly.171 Often a patent is limited to a unique form or improvement
over an already existing patented product. 72 Justice Black, writing for
the majority in Northern Pacific, 7 acknowledged that fact and stated
that in such a situation "the economic power resulting from the patent
privileges is slight.' ' 74 Furthermore, frequently the patented article is
441 (1948). Thus, an idea itself is not patentable. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87
U.S. (1 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) (quoted in Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185, .101 S. Ct. at 1056).
168. Bauer, supra note 12, at 333 n.179.
169. This patent control right is really no more than property ownership, as the Sixth
Circuit stated in Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 914 n.25 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 1504 (1979). See generally Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine
in Infringement Suits, 9 UCLA L. Rev. 76, 102 (1962).
170. See, e.g., Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (referring to the grant of "a patent or similar monopoly over a product");
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46, 83 S. Ct. 97, 102 (1962) (referring to
"the statutorily granted patent monopoly"); and International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 395, 68 S. Ct. 12, 15 (1947) ("limited monopoly" of a patent).
171. Cf. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 53 S. Ct. 554
(1932), in which the Court stated that a patent "is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly."
Id. at 186, 53 S. Ct. at 557. The Court there stated that a monopoly takes something
from the people. A patentee takes nothing from the people, but instead, on expiration
of his patent, gives his knowledge to the people. Id. at 186, 53 S. Ct. at 557. In Dubilier,
the United States was seeking the assignment of patent rights on inventions made by a
government employee.
172. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8, 78 S. Ct. 514, 520 n.8
(1958). According to Turner, "often" is probably an understatement. Turner, supra note
9, at 57.
173. 356 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 514 (1958).
174.' 356 U.S. at 10 n.8, 78 S. Ct. at 520 n.8. See also Austin, supra note 25, at
112 (stating that Justice Black's Northern Pacific footnote criticism is consistent with
reality); Bauer, supra note 12, at 333 n.179; Lavey, supra note 25, at 438 ("substitutable
products may exist such that a patent imparts only limited protection from competition);
Singer, supra note 25, at 661; and Slawson, supra note 25, at 691.
Cf. Turner, supra note 9, at 57 ("a patent proves no more than distinctiveness, and
there is no apparent reason why anything more should be required [to prove economic
power] in nonpatent cases," a viewpoint apparently rejected by the Court in Fortner I
and Fortner II; see Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 505 n.2, 89 S. Ct. 1252, .1259 n.2, and
Fortner 11, 429 U.S. 610, 621, 97 S. Ct. 861, 868 (1977)).
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only an insignificant component of the final product, in which case the
patent could only confer "anemic leverage."' ' 5 As Justice O'Connor
noted in Hyde, "a patent holder has no market power in any relevant
sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product."'176 While
the patent holder has control rights over his product-just as the owner
of a piece of land has control of the disposition of the land-he does
not necessarily have a market-wide monopoly or the ability to impose
a tie-in. 177
When the tying product is copyrighted rather than patented, the
potential legal barrier to competitor duplication of the tying product is
even weaker. While a copyright holder has the exclusive right to re-
produce the copyrighted work, to distribute copies, to prepare derivative
works, and to publicly perform or display the copyrighted work, 178
copyright protection, like patent protection, presents absolutely no barrier
to the production and sale of functional equivalents to the copyrighted
tying product.' 79 If a motion picture producer hired a novelist to write
a Civil War-era novel set in Georgia with a strong-minded female main
character, that novel would not, without more, infringe the copyright
on "Gone with the Wind.''" 80 If a software manufacturer created a
175. Austin, supra note 25, at 112.
176. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1571 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
177. On this point, see Singer, supra note 25, at 661 ("implicit in the [Loew's]
presumption is the belief that since a patent or copyright is a statutory monopoly, it
follows that each must be a market monopoly"). For a discussion of the extent to which
confusion about the nature of the "patent monopoly" influenced the development of the
Loew's presumption, see infra notes 217-312 and accompanying text.
A patentee may, of course, have market control. See, e.g., International Business Mach.
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 56 S. Ct. 701 (1936) (IBM, one of only two
manufacturers of certain tabulating machines, leased its machines on the condition that
lessees use only IBM's tabulating cards with the machines. IBM's tying product market
share was higher than eighty percent.).
178. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The copyright holder's exclusive rights are subject to
limited use by others as "fair use." See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
179. Other commentators who have made similar statements are Jones, supra note 25,
at 41; Lavey, supra note 25, at 438; Matheson, supra, note 25, at 880 n.102 ("[w]here
the copyright does not prevent others from developing functionally equivalent products,
as is the case of computer software, the presumption of power may be ill-founded");
and Note, supra note 16, at 1044. Cf. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506
F.2d 658, at 664 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974) (presence of a trademark does not prevent competitor
duplication); and Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976) (unlike
a patent or copyright, a trademark protects only the name or symbol used for a product).
180. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), where
the court held that a movie, "The Cohens and the Kellys," did not infringe the copyright
on the earlier play "Abie's Irish Rose," even though the movie, like the earlier play,
dealt with a quarrel between a Jewish and Irish father, the marriage of their children,
the birth of grandchildren, and a reconciliation.
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software program that is functionally equivalent to an existing copy-
righted program the second program would not, without more, infringe
the copyright on the copyrighted program. Copyright protection only
protects the copyright holder from a "taking" or copying of his par-
ticular expression.' 8' Copyright protection doesonot prevent competitors
.from offering their own functional equivalents to copyrighted tying
products unless the competitors "copy" the copyrighted product's expres-
sion to create that functional equivalent. 82 Furthermore, a competitor
of a seller with a copyrighted desirable tying product can, without
violating that copyright, study the tying seller's product and produce
his own product based on the ideas or principles exhibited in the tying
product. Copyright protection does not protect the copyright holder
from the "copying" of the ideas or principles involved in the copyrighted
work.'83 Thus, as one trial court has noted, copyright notices attached
to computer software do not prevent competitors from developing func-
tionally equivalent software.'8 4 Programmers are free to read copyrighted
programs and use the underlying ideas in preparing their own works.' 5
181. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act states that "Din no case does copyright
protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process ... concept, principle or discovery."
17 U.S.C. § 102(b), codifying earlier case law (Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) and
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460 (1954)). See generally M. Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright, § 1.10[B] (1986).
182. While the concept of infringement is not codified, most copyright infringement
cases involve a plaintiff's claim that the defendant created his work by "copying" the
plaintiff's work. See M. Nimmer, supra note 181, § 8.01[A].
183. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). As the Court stated in Mazer v. Stein, "[u]nlike a
patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed." 347 U.S. at 217, 74 S.
Ct. at 470.
184. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1238-39 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3466; Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A
Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980). See 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 Supp. 1350, 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(stating that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence tending to show that the copyright
on the tying product (software) would prevent the defendant's competitors from creating
substantially similar products); and A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 727, 732 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff conceded
that defendant's competitors could produce software equivalent to the defendant's co-
pyrighted software).
185. National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU") Final Report at 20 (1970). See Apple Computer v. Formula International
Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523-25 (9th Cir. 1984).
The boundary between the taking of ideas and the taking of expression may, of course,
be elusive, and is particularly likely to be so in copyright infringement cases involving
computer software. Courts deciding software cases are beginning to struggle with the
question of whether what was copied was the idea or the expression. See, e.g., Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1234-40; Digital Commu-
nications Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., No. C86-128-A (N.D. Ga., March
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Beyond that, a copyright holder, unlike a patentee, has no rights
or remedies against a competitor who, working independently of the
copyrighted holder's work, somehow creates and sells an exact duplicate
of the copyright holder's work. s6 As Judge Learned Hand has stated,
"[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose
a new Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author', and
if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem.' 8 7 While only
"original" works qualify for copyright, 8 s the copyright "originality"
requirement does not demand product novelty, in the patent sense. 89
The copyright "originality" requirement is satisfied if the work "Orig-
inated" with the author, meaning that the author did not copy someone
else's work.' 90 An author who independently created a work identical
to an existing work not only would not be an infringer, he would be
entitled to copyright protection on his own work. 9'
In Data General"2 the trial court recognized that copyright is not a
legal barrier to the development of functional equivalents for a desirable
tying product. First, in its opinion ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, 93 the trial judge noted that affidavits submitted by
31, 1987) (raising the question of whether a competitor is free to copy menu screens from
existing software); SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp.
816, 829 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,
462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978); and Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252-53 (3d Cir. 1983).
186. See M. Nimmer, supra note 181, § 8.01[A].
187. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669, 56 S. Ct. 835 (1936). Of course, in the "real world" a copyright case
defendant who independently created an exact duplicate to a copyrighted product might
have difficulty over coming jurors' suspicion that he actually copied the copyrighted work.
188. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
189. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). See
generally M. Nimmer, supra note 181, § 2.01[A].
190. In Alfred Bell, the court made the following comment:
The defendants' contention apparently results from the ambiguity of the word
"original" [in the copyright law]. It may mean startling, novel or unusual, a
marked departure from the past .... Original" in reference to a copyrighted
work means that the particular work "owes its origin" to the "author." No
large measure of novelty is necessary.
191 F.2d at 102. See generally Milgrim, supra note 126, § 9.05[3] (comparing copyright
"originality" and patent "novelty").
191. As Milgrim states, in a copyright infringement suit, the question of whether a
given work is an infringing "copy" or an independently created work is evidentiary. If
the alleged infringer had access to the copyrighted work, copying is presumed if, the
alleged copy is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. The presumption is rebuttable.
Milgrim, supra note 126, § 9.05[5].
192. In re Data Gen. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) and 529
F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1982); rev'd sub. nom. Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp.,
734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1984).
193. 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
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defendant Data General's experts stated that "copyright notices attached
to computer software do not prevent others from developing functionally
equivalent programs." I9, In its later opinion granting Data General's motion
for a judgment n.o.v., the trial court stated that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove that Data General's competitors were prevented from developing
functionally equivalent software. 9 The court noted that "[n]o evidence
was offered as to the actual effect of copyright notices on the devel-
opment of comparable software.' ' 96 The court of appeals, on the other
hand, viewed copyright as "a legal bar to its [the software's] reproduction
by competitors.' ' 97 The Ninth Circuit, in addition to citing Loew's for
that proposition, referred to the "abundant evidence" in the case that
Data General's software "could not be reproduced without infringing
defendants' copyright."'' 9 The appropriate inquiry for the case was not,
however, whether there was a legal barrier to exact reproduction of
Data General's software. The appropriate inquiry was whether there
existed a legal barrier to competitors' production of functionally equiv-
alent software. The Ninth Circuit, dismissing the trial court's concern
with this question as a mistaken belief by the trial court that economic
power throughout the entire tying product was required to establish a
Sherman Act section 1 violation, 99 clearly did not understand the rel-
evance of functional equivalents to copyrighted tying products.
194. Id. at 1113 (footnote omitted). The court noted that those statements were
consistent with a recent decision by another federal trial court, Data Cash Systems, Inc.
v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
195. 529 F. Supp. at 816.
196. 529 F. Supp. at 816.
197. Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984).
198. Id. at 1342.
199. Id. at 1344-46. The Ninth Circuit rejected (with a puzzling reference to its recent
decisions in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984),
and Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)), the
trial court's statement (529 F. Supp. at 816) that the Loew's presumption may be in-
appropriate for software because copyright protection does not necessarily prevent others
from taking the material embodiment of the source program. 734 F.2d at 1344 n.5. If
the trial court was stating that software is not protected by copyright, the appellate court
was correct in rejecting the statement. The trial court may, however, have been saying
that since copyright protects only the expression in the work, copyright presents no real
legal barrier to competitors' duplication of the product-a statement that is true not just
for copyrighted software, but for all copyrighted products.
In Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
54 U.S.L.W. 3698 (1986), the Seventh Circuit criticized the Ninth Circuit's Data General
opinion, stating that "[tlo the extent" that Data General "holds that a plaintiff may
prevail, without establishing power over price ... by showing that rivals cannot produce
exactly the same package," Data General is in conflict with other cases. 776 F.2d at 673
n.4.
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Copyright, like patent, has been termed a "statutory monopoly. ' '200
Because copyright protection gives the copyright owner rights only against
those who "copy" his product's expression, and not against those who
take his underlying ideas or independently create the product, a copyright
presents even less of a barrier to the creation of product substitutes
than does a patent. Thus, copyright is even further removed than patent
from market-wide monopoly. As Milgrim stated in his treatise, a co-
pyright is "not a monopoly in any ordinary sense of the word, since
the author has a 'monopoly' of his own work only in the sense that
a laborer has in his labor." ' 20 1 The Court in Loew's, in attempting to
justify its presumption of economic power on the basis of the "dis-
tinctiveness" required for patent or copyright, apparently viewed both
patents and copyrights as conferring market monopolies, for the Court
stated that "[s]ince one of the objectives of the patent laws is to reward
uniqueness ... the existence of a valid patent on the tying product,
without more, establishes a distinctiveness sufficient to conclude that
any tying arrangement involving the patented product would have an-
ticompetitive consequences. ' 20 2 The "distinctiveness" required for the
grant of a patent, product novelty, 203 is no measure of the product's
desirability or likely commercial success. Any attempted tie-in using an
undesirable patented tying product will have no anticompetitive conse-
quences. In the event of an attempted tie-in involving a desirable patented
product, it is important to remember that the patent does not prevent
others from developing and selling functional substitutes for the tying
product; some other inventor could come up with a functional substitute
that did. not infringe the seller's patent and could even itself meet the
novelty requirement for a separate patent. 23 4 As to copyrighted tying
products, the only "distinctiveness" required for copyright is that the
200. See, e.g., Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 619, 97 S. Ct. 861, 867 (1977); United States
v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47, 83 S. Ct. 97, 103 (1962); and United States v. Paramount
Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158, 68 S. Ct. 915, 919.
201. Milgrim, supra note 126, § 9.05[1], at 9-147. Appellant Loew's in its Supreme
Court brief pointed out the difference between the copyright "monopoly" and a market
monopoly, stating that "the copyright monopoly enjoyed by each defendant over each
film which it licensed was no different from any seller's absolute ownership of the goods
it offers in the market." Brief for the Appellants at 15, United States v. Loew's Inc.,
371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962) (in 10 P. Kurland and G. Casper, Antitrust Law: Major
Briefs and Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 Term-1975
Term 257, 274 (1979)).
202. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46, 83 S. Ct. 97, 103 (1962), (citations
omitted).
203. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1982).
204. See Singer, supra note 25, at 661: "Since it does not necessarily follow that a
statutory monopoly implies a market monopoly, the presumption of illegality in patent
cases appears to rest on a weak foundation."
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work have originated with the author. The copyrighted tying product
seller's competitors are free to come out with their own "original" (as
opposed to copied) functional substitute to the tying product and to
copy anything other than the author's expression.
A copyrighted or patented tying product should not be presumed
to give its seller power over price, for the copyright or patent is not a
guarantee or even an indicator of product desirability and not a barrier
to competitor creation of comparable products. A patent or copyright
may, however, help the tying seller achieve market power, as Justice
O'Connor noted in Hyde.205 As one commentator has noted, when,
because of a legal barrier to product duplication, a seller "is able to
convince some buyers that there is no exact substitute for his product, '20 6
the possibility of a successful tie-in exists. 20 7 In such a case there really
are, for the buyers so convinced, no acceptable functional equivalents,
although in a broader sense, functionally equivalent products do exist.
Buyers who would otherwise, because of the higher product price rep-
resented by the tie-in, purchase substitute products, will instead accept
the tie, because they so strongly desire the tying seller's particular version
of the tying product. "Gone with the Wind" provides an example of
this consumer loyalty phenomenon. There is, as the Court said in Loew's,
"but one 'Gone with the Wind,' 208 and movie viewers would presumably
have a high preference for viewing this movie rather than some other
movie-even some other movie set in Georgia involving the Civil war-
era adventures of a young woman. 209 It is easy to see that movie theater
owners and television station owners, aware of the strong consumer
preference for "Gone With the Wind", could be forced to pay a higher-
than-usual dollar price for that movie, or in the alternative, accept a
tie-in. Even other similarly-themed movies really would not be acceptable
205. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1571 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
206. Note, supra note 12, at 94 (quoted by the Court in Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610,
521 n.14, 97 S. Ct. 861, 868 n.14 (1977)).
207. According to the author of the work referenced in the preceding note, a seller
who faces a negative sloping demand curve for his tying product can impose a tie. The
negative sloping demand curve shows the seller's ability to raise the tying product's price
by imposing a tie-in. In the view of the author of that Note, the negative sloping demand
curve will exist when "the tying product is significantly 'differentiated,' that is, when
through use of patents ... copyrights ... or other variations which cannot be freely
reproduced, the seller is able to convince some buyers that there is no exact substitute."
Note, supra note 12, at 94 (footnotes omitted).
208. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 n.6, 83 S. Ct. 97, 104 n.6 (1962).
209. In Loew's the defendants unsuccessfully argued that the buyers, television stations,
really had no such preferences for any particular movie-they merely wanted movies to
fill late-night programming. 371 U.S. at 47-48, 83 S. Ct. at 103-04.
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substitutes for viewers (and stations) wanting "Gone with the Wind. ' ' 210
A product such as "Gone with the Wind" is "differentiated" or
"distinctive" not only in the sense of having the minimal level of
"originality" required for copyright and the minimal protection from
competitor reproduction provided by copyright; it is "distinctive" in the
sense of being so strongly desired by consumers as to give its seller
power over price. 21I For the truly unique, highly desirable product such
as "Gone with the Wind," or "Cabbage Patch Kid" dolls, copyright
protection is one weapon in the seller's arsenal of weapons for the
prevention of competitor duplication and encroachment. For many prod-
ucts, trademark law rights,2 2 state unfair competition law, 213 and mar-
keting strategy, 2 4 together with copyright protection, can help the seller
create and protect a desirable market position. The question, though,
is whether the Loew's presumption should exist. While the patent or
copyright legal barriers will, in the case of a desirable tying product
for which some buyers see no exact substitute, help the seller gain and
keep economic power by protecting the seller against product duplication,
without product desirability and this specialized buyer-level product per-
ception, the product's seller will have no economic power. In a given
210. The Justice Department, in its Northern Pacific Supreme Court brief, took the
position that International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947),
was decided on the grounds of consumer preference for the defendant's particular salt
machines and did not rest on any finding that the defendant had a market-wide monopoly
in salt machines: "Since no other machine could be exactly like those of International
Salt, persons who for whatever reasons preferred International Salt's machines were forced
to deal with the latter." Brief for the United States at 14, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 336 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 514 (1956) (emphasis added) (in 4 P. Kurland and G.
Casper, Antitrust Law: Major Briefs and Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 1955 Term-1975 Term 71, 87 (1979)).
211. In the opinion of this author, the author of Note, supra note 12, while correct
in stating that it is tying product differentiation that is the key to seller ability to impose
a tie, has exaggerated the extent to which patent or copyright prevents competitor re-
production of the tying product and has thus exaggerated the "uniqueness" or differ-
entiation resulting from patent or copyright. That writer views the "uniqueness" as an
indication that a tie-in is likely 'to result in foreclosure of competition. Id. at 94.
212. Trademarks give buyers an indication of the origin of goods and give sellers a
means of protecting goodwill. For federal registrability a trademark must, inter alia,
"distinguish" the applicant's goods from the goods of other sellers. 15 U.S.C. § 1052
(1982). The federal statute gives the trademark owner remedies against trademark in-
fringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982). The plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit must
show that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark involves a "likelihood of
confusion." 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). Certain trademark rights also arise under state law
and common law.
213. Unfair competition law, among other things, protects a seller from "passing off"
by other sellers.
214. Marketing strategy aimed at convincing buyers that they must have this particular
seller's product would appear to be an important factor in creating economic power.
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case, the jury can consider, as part of the evidence of a tying seller's
economic power, the existence of copyright or patent protection on the
tying product, the exact nature of such protection, the extent to which
the copyright or patent has prevented competitor duplication, 25 and the
extent to which buyers perceive that they must have this seller's particular
product. In a case involving a desirable tying product for which some
buyers see no acceptable substitute, the "Gone with the Wind" situation,
the jury will reach the correct conclusion, that the seller has economic
power. 16
I1. ORIGIN OF THE LOEW'S PRESUMPTION
The Court's first statement of the principle referred to in this article
as the "Loew's presumption" actually appeared as dictum in the Court's
1953 Times-Picayune27 decision. In that case, Justice Clark, writing for
the majority, stated that in tying arrangement cases "dominance," or
control by the seller of the tying product market, was a necessary element
215. See A.I. Root Co. v. Computer Dynamics, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ohio
1985), aff'd, 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986); and 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591
F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Mich. 1984). Both of these cases are trial court decisions granting
summary judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiff's failure to raise a disputed
issue of fact as to whether the defendant possessed economic power with respect to a
copyrighted tying product. In 3 P.M. the trial judge does not appear to have given any
weight to the Loew's presumption of economic power. In the judge's view the plaintiff
had the burden of showing that none of the defendants' competitors could have produced
functional equivalents to the tying product, but did not even try to make such a showing.
591 F. Supp. at 1358. In Root the district court relied heavily on 3 P.M.
216. Accord, Austin, supra note 25, at 112 (urging that the jury makes the deter-
mination of whether economic power exists on a case-by-case basis, whether the tying
product is patented or unpatented. He states that while the Loew's "tying" films were
unique, "a blanket policy of viewing all patented tying products" as possessing that
strength is "myopic and unrealistic"). The opposing view is expressed in Note, supra
note 12.
Consumer desire for a particular seller's product may be easier to achieve in the area
of copyrighted creative works than in the area of patented utilitarian works, as Milgrim
has stated. Milgrim, supra note 126, § 10.01[2], at 10-73 n.156. If that is true, then
copyright, while presenting less of a legal barrier to competitor production of a functional
equivalent than patent, may be more likely than patent to generate economic power.
Another commentator has stated that a copyrighted computer operating system is not
unique in the same sense that a movie is, for "[t]wo copyrighted software programs that
are functionally equivalent will be indistinguishable to the average consumer, whereas two
movies, even with similar plot lines, will not." Note, supra note 16, at 1044.
Cf. Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976), stating that the
existence of economic power with respect to a trademarked tying product is a question
of fact.




of a Sherman Act violation. 28 According to Justice Clark, in earlier
Sherman Act tying arrangement cases 219 patents or copyrights had sup-
plied proof of market control. 2 0 Justice Clirk's statement is, in the
view of this author, judicial fiction. The Times-Picayune opinion was
the first Supreme Court Sherman Act tying arrangement case to require
proof of market power as an element of the per se violation.22' The
earlier cases, contrary to Justice Clark's statement, contained no dis-
cussion of the seller's economic power; there was, when those earlier
cases were decided, no requirement that the seller be shown to possess
market power in the tying product. Justice Clark appears to have begun
the process of creating the Loew's presumption when, in Times-Picayune,
after imposing market power as an element of the per se violation for
tying arrangements, he sought to reconcile the Court's earlier tying cases
with his Times-Picayune view of Sherman Act tying arrangement doc-
trine.
In the years preceding the three earliest Sherman Act tying arrange-
ment cases, International Salt,222 United States v. Paramount Pictures,
218. Id. at 612-13, 73 S. Ct. at 882-83.
219. The earlier cases mentioned by Justice Clark were International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947); United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 68 S. Ct: 915 (1948); and United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct.
941 (1948). The major portion of Justice Clark's discussion of these cases in Times-
Picayune appears at 345 U.S. at 608, 73 S. Ct. at 880.
220. Justice Clark's exact words were as follows: "Unlike other 'tying' cases where
patents or copyrights supplied the requisite market control, any equivalent market 'dom-
inance' in this case must rest on comparative marketing data." 345 U.S. at 611, 73 S.
Ct. at 882 (footnote omitted).
221. The following commentators have made similar observations: Lavey, supra note
15, at 442 (stating that while the Court had, before International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947), engaged in economic analysis in two Clayton
Act tying arrangement cases, United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451,
52 S. Ct. 363 (1922), and United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 298 U.S.
131, 56 S. Ct. 701 (1936), the Court abandoned economic analysis in International Salt);
Note, supra note 12, at 87 (stating that the International Salt opinion did not discuss
economic power).
Slawson indicates, correctly, that the two cases that the Times-Picayune Court cited
for the "dominance" or monopoly power requirement (345 U.S. at 608, 73 S. Ct. at
880) do not support such a requirement. Slawson, supra note 25, at 685. One of those
cases is Paramount, discussed in infra notes 217-312 and accompanying text. In the other
"supporting" case, United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941 (1948), the
government challenged agreements between motion picture distributors and theater owners
granting the theater owners the exclusive rights in their areas to show first- and second-
run films. The trial court dismissed the complaint, 68 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Okla. 1946),
based on its finding that there was no showing of conspiracy to monopolize between the
distributors and the exhibitors. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
it is not always necessary to find specific intent to restrain trade or build a monopoly
to find an antitrust violation. 334 U.S. at 105, 68 S. Ct. at 944.
222. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947).
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Inc. ,223 and United States v. Griffith,2 4 the Supreme Court reviewed a
number of patent infringement cases in which a patent holder sought
to enforce patent licensing restrictions requiring the licensee to use the
patented device only with unpatented supplies purchased from the pa-
tentee. For example, in the 1942 case of Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co.,225 the plaintiffs' lease agreement for patented machines
used to place salt in canned food contained a provision requiring that
lessees use the machines only with the plaintiff's salt tablets. In Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. ,226 the plaintiff,
holder of a patent on a film-feeding device, required manufacturers
licensed to make the film feeder to agree that they would sell the device
only to purchasers who agreed to use the feeder with the plaintiff's
film. In Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp.2 2 7 the
plaintiff, holder of a patent on a refrigerated transportation package,
licensed the package for use only with solid carbon dioxide sold by the
plaintiff.
In Morton Salt, Motion Picture Patents, Carbice, and similar cases
the patent holder seeking to enforce a use restriction was denied patent
relief on equitable grounds because of what the Court viewed as an
unlawful attempt to "extend the patent monopoly" to unpatented prod-
ucts. 22s These "patent misuse" cases, like the later Sherman Act tying
223. 334 U.S. 131, 68 S. Ct. 915 (1948).
224. 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941 (1948).
225. 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942).
226. 243 U.S. 502, 37 S. Ct. 416 (1917).
227. 283 U.S. 27, 51 S. Ct. 334 (1931).
228. While the earliest of the patent misuse cases merely held that no patent infringe-
ment was involved when contract restrictions on the use and purchase of unpatented
supplies were violated, later cases denied the patentee relief for clear patent infringement
because of the illegal "monopoly extension" to unpatented supplies. Compare Carbice,
283 U.S. 27, 51 S. Ct. 334, with Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402.
For years the practice of conditioning sales or licenses of patent rights on the purchase
of unpatented materials from the patentee was considered legal. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B.
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 364 (1912), in which the Court held hat the patentee
of a mimeograph machine could lawfully require that the machine be used only with
supplies purchased from the patentee. In Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 100 S. Ct. 2601 (1980), the Court characterized Henry as the "high-water
mark" of this pro-tying climate, followed five years later by "what may be characterized
through the lens of hindsight as an inevitable judicial reaction" in the Motion Picture
Patents case. Id. at 190-91, 100 S. Ct. at 2610.
According to Bowman, Justice White entered a vigorous dissented in Henry, advancing
"the proposition that a tie-in to a patented commodity was the equivalent of allowing a
monopoly over the tied product." Bowman, supra note 3, at 30 (footnote omitted). This
"patent extension" theory became the majority viewpoint in the Motion Picture Patents
case. Id. For a full discussion of the patent misuse cases, see Lowin, supra note 25, and
Nicoson, supra note 169, at 76-88. Some of these cases were direct infringement cases,
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arrangement cases, involved some conditioning of the availability of a
desired product on the buyer/lessee's agreement to take other products
(unpatented supplies) as well. The patent misuse cases, like the Sherman
Act tying cases, involved product tie-ins. The patent misuse cases differed
from Sherman Act tying cases in that they required no allegations or
proof of an "unreasonable restraint of trade," a prerequisite for Sherman
Act illegality. At issue in the misuse cases was the question of whether
the plaintiff should be granted or denied injunctive and compensatory
relief for patent infringement. 229 While, in the patent misuse cases, the
defendants (infringers) used the plaintiffs' product tie-in as a shield (an
equitable defense to admitted infringement), in International Salt,230 the
Justice Department attacked a tie-in directly, suing under both the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. In International Salt, the Justice
Department sought an injunction against the defendant's enforcement
of a lease provision requiring lessees of the defendant's patented salt
machines to use the machines only with salt purchased from the defend-
ant.23 The trial court had granted summary judgment for the government
as to both the Sherman Act violation and the Clayton Act violation.
23 2
The Supreme Court, in a short opinion written by Justice Jackson,
affirmed. 233 As to the Sherman Act violation, the Court found that
there was no question but that the defendant's restraint on trade was
unreasonable. The Court, comparing the defendant's tying arrangement
to price-fixing, stated that "it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market. ' 23 4 The Court did not discuss
the defendant's strength in the salt machine market; in fact, the Court
upheld the trial court's refusal to take the defendant's evidence of the
while others were contributory infringement cases (cases in which the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant sold an unpatented product to the user of a patented article with
knowledge that the buyer's use of the unpatented product with the patented article would
violate the user's license to use the patented article).
229. The Court's decision in the Motion Picture Patents case mentioned the Clayton
Act, but only as an expression of public policy concerns that motivated the Court to
deny patent relief to the plaintiff. 243 U.S. at 517-18, 37 S. Ct. at 421.
230. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947).
231. The restriction for one of the patented machines read as follows: "It is further
mutually agreed that the said Salt Tablet Depositor(s) . . .shall be used only in conjunction
with Salt Tablets sold or manufactured by the Lessor." 332 U.S. at 395 n.6, 68 S. Ct.
at 14 n.6.
232. 6 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12.
233. Appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court. 332 U.S. at 394, 68 S. Ct. at
14.
234. 332 U.S. at 396, 68 S. Ct. at 15, citing Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703 (1941).
As to the Clayton Act violation, the International Salt Court stated that "the tendency
of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious." 332 U.S. at 396,
68 S. Ct. at 15.
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availability of other salt machines. 235 In response to the defendant's
contention that summary judgment should not have been granted because
a trial was needed to determine whether an unreasonable restraint of
trade existed, the Court, comparing the tie-in with price-fixing, stated
that "the admitted facts left no genuine issue, 23 6 as "[tihe volume of
business affected by [the defendant's] contracts cannot be said to be
insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to
accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious. '23 7
The Court had, in the earlier patent misuse cases, refused relief for
patent infringement because of plaintiffs' tie-ins of patented products
and unpatented supplies, viewed by the Court as a patentee's attempt
to extend a patent monopoly to unpatented products. In International
Salt, the Court found a tie-in involving a patented tying product to be
an unreasonable restraint of trade, a per se violation of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. The Court in International Salt, echoing the language
of the earlier patent misuse cases, viewed the defendant's tying clauses
as an attempt by the defendant to extend the "monopoly" on the
patented salt machines to salt:
The appellant's patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention
they reward. From them appellant derives a right to restrain others
from making, vending, or using the patented machines. But the
patents confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented
salt. By contracting to close this market for salt against com-
petition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for
which its patents afford no immunity from the anti-trust laws. 238
The Court cited as support for that last sentence three patent misuse
cases. 23 9 In that sentence the Court appears to be expressing two different
ideas: (1) the defendant's tie of salt to the desired patented salt machines
was an illegal restraint of trade; and (2) nothing in the patent laws
immunized the defendant from liability for that restraint of trade. 240 In
the first point, the Court echoed the hostility expressed in the earlier
patent misuse cases toward patent "extensions": A patent holder must
235. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8, 78 S. Ct. 514, 520 n.8
(1958).
236. 332 U.S. at 396, 68 S. Ct. at 15.
237. Id. Possibly the defendant was being used by International Salt as a metering
device, as suggested by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Hyde, 466 U.S.
2, 36 n.4, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1571 n.4 (1984), and by various commentators.
238. 332 U.S. at 395-96, 68 S. Ct. at 15 (citations omitted).
239. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S. Ct. 268 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 S. Ct. 278 (1944).
240. As one commentator stated concerning International Salt, "absence of immunity
is surely different than per se violation." Lowin, supra note 23, at 98.
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be strictly limited in enjoyment of patent rights and not allowed to
expand those rights; if the patentee is allowed to expand those rights
to unpatented products, salt, for example, he will be getting more than
his due, to the detriment of competitors, other salt sellers. Just as
hostility toward "patent extensions" had, in the earlier patent misuse
cases, led the Court to deny relief for patent infringement, that hostility
provided the basis for the conclusion in International Salt that the
Sherman Act had been violated. 241
Justice O'Connor, criticizing the Hyde majority's acceptance of the
Loew's presumption, stated that in Hyde the patent misuse doctrine
"may have influenced the Court's willingness to strike down the ar-
rangement at issue in International Salt. 2 42 This author's view is that
the patent misuse cases not only influenced the Court to uphold the
trial judge's decision in International Salt, the Court actually approached
International Salt as a patent misuse case, allowing hostility toward
"patent extensions" developed in patent misuse cases, to substitute for
a real inquiry into the likely impact of the defendant's practices on
competition.
Justice O'Connor views Paramount, decided one year after Inter-
national Salt, as having been decided not under "the schema of the
tying cases" but under the "principle of 'patent misuse."' ' 243 In Para-
mount, the Court affirmed a trial court decree prohibiting motion picture
distributors from block booking movies. 244 The Paramount trial court
had condemned the block booking policies based on the theory that the
licensing of a desired film only on the condition that another film be
taken "adds to the monopoly of a single copyrighted picture, that of
another copyrighted picture which must be taken and exhibited in order
to secure the first. ' 245 The Supreme Court, citing several patent misuse
241. Bowman views the patent misuse cases as the source of the concern, later expressed
in an antitrust context as the "leverage" evil of tie-ins, that tying arrangements allow
the extension of a monopoly from the tying product to the tied product. Bowman, supra
note 3, at 30-31.
In Hyde, the Court repeated the traditional concern with "monopoly extension," stating
that "[alny effort to enlarge the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market power
it confers to restrain competition in the market for a second product will undermine
competition on the merits in that second market." Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16, 104 S. Ct.
1551, 1560 (1984). The Court there appears to have mistakenly assumed that all patents
confer market power. See supra notes 100-216 and accompanying text.
242. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 38 n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 1572 n.7.
243. Id.
244. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158, 68 S. Ct. 915,
929 (1948), aff'g 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) and 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
Block booking was only one of the many allegedly anticompetitive practices involved in
that case.
245. 66 F. Supp. at 349, quoted in the Paramount Supreme Court opinion, 334 U.S.
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cases, affirmed, 246 adopting the trial court's "copyright enlargement"
hostility without discussing the differences between patent and copyright
qualifications and protection:
Where a high quality film greatly desired is licensed only if an
inferior one is taken, the latter borrows quality from the former
and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other ....
[T]he result is to add to the monopoly of the copyright in
violation of the principle of the patent cases involving tying
clauses .247
The same hostility to "extensions of the copyright monopoly" was
expressed in United States v. Griffith.2 48 In neither of these cases did
the Court inquire as to whether the defendants had economic power in
the tying product or even identify particular tying and tied products.
In Times-Picayune2 49 the Justice Department challenged a newspaper
publisher's requirement that advertisers wanting advertising space in
either the publisher's morning or evening paper purchase advertising
space in both papers. While there was a rival evening paper, the defend-
ant had no competition in the morning paper market. The government
challenged the practice under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
trial court found both a section 1 and a section 2 Sherman Act violation
and enjoined the defendants from continuing the practice. 20 The Supreme
Court reversed the trial court. The Court acknowledged the evil of tying
arrangements, quoting dictum from the 1949 Standard Stations251 decision
holding that Standard Oil's exclusive dealing contracts with service sta-
tions violated section 3 of the Clayton Act:
[T]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition. By conditioning his sale of one
at 157, 68 S. Ct. at 924.
246. 334 U.S. at 157, 68 S. Ct. at 929 (citing Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,
309 U.S. 436, 60 S. Ct. 618 (1940)); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942); and Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,
64 S. Ct. 268 (1944).
247. 334 U.S. at 158, 68 S. Ct. at 929. The Court's only discussion of the nature of
copyright consisted of a quotation from Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 52 S.
Ct. 546 (1932), in which the Court considered the question of whether the state of Georgia
could tax copyright royalties.
248. 334 U.S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941 (1948). Griffith is discussed supra note 221.
249. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S. Ct. 872
(1953).
250. 105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S. Ct. 872 (1953).
Appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act. 345 U.S. at
598, 73 S. Ct. at 874.
251. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 59 S. Ct. 1051 (1959) [hereinafter
referred to as Standard Stations].
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commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the
abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the "tied"
product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses
of the open market. But any intrinsic superiority of the "tied"
product would convince freely choosing buyers to select it over
others, anyway. Thus [iun the usual case only the prospect of
reducing competition would persuade a seller to adopt such a
contract and only his control of the supply of the tying device,
whether conferred by patent monopoly or otherwise obtained,
could induce a buyer to enter one.25 2
Justice Clark, writing for the majority in Times-Picayune, then went
on to say that not every tying arrangement violates the Sherman Act:
For a Sherman Act violation to exist the seller must have "a monopolistic
position in the market for the 'tying' product" and must restrain "a
substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product. '253 The Court
traced the "monopoly" requirement back to a 1920 case brought under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,254 Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Gratz,2"1 in which it had been held, on a point of pleading,
that a complaint which charged a seller with conditioning his sale of
steel ties on purchases of jute bagging did not state an actionable claim
because the complaint failed to allege that the defendant had monop-
olistic purpose or market control.
In Standard Stations,2 6 a Clayton Act exclusive dealing case decided
by the Court after International Salt and before Times-Picayune, the
Court had considered the question of what proof satisfied the require-
ment of section 3 of the Clayton Act that agreements held illegal under
that section be found to have the effect of substantially lessening com-
petition. In Standard Stations, the Court stated that section 3 of the
Clayton Act "was directed to prohibiting specific practices even though
not covered by the broad terms of the Sherman Act. '25 7 Specifically,
the Court in Standard Stations asked whether "the requirement of
showing that the effect of the [challenged] agreements 'may be to sub-
252. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605, 73 S. Ct. at 878-79 (quoting from Standard
Stations, 337 U.S. at 305-306, 69 S. Ct. at 1058) (footnote and citations omitted).
253. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608-09, 73 S. Ct. at 880-81. The Court stated that
the "narrower standards" expressed in section 3 of the Clayton Act would be satisfied
from a showing of either factor because the Clayton Act's prerequisite to illegality, potential
lessening of competition, could be inferred from either factor. Id.
254. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982), which states that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce ... are declared unlawful."
255. 253 U.S. 421, 40 S. Ct. 572 (1920), cited in Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 606,
73 S. Ct. at 879.
256. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
257. 337 U.S. at 297, 50 S. Ct. at 1054 (footnote omitted).
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stantially lessen competition' may be met simply by proof that a sub-
stantial portion of commerce is affected or whether it must also be
demonstrated that competitive activity has actually diminished or prob-
ably will diminish. 25 8 The Court included in its review of earlier Clayton
Act cases 25 9 International Salt, a Sherman Act-Clayton Act case, as well
as two other Clayton Act tying cases, United Shoe Machinery Corp. v.
United States,260 and International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States.261 In Standard Stations, the government apparently argued that
International Salt had held that no showing of "economic consequences"
was required to establish a section 3 Clayton Act violation, once it had
been established that the volume of business affected was not insignificant
and that the effect of the challenged contracts was to foreclose com-
petitors from a substantial market .262 The Standard Stations Court ac-
knowledged that International Salt, "at least as to contracts tying the
sale of a nonpatented to a patented product, rejected the necessity of
demonstrating economic consequences, ' 263 but found important economic
differences between exclusive dealing contracts, the subject of Standard
Stations,264 and tying arrangements: While, in the view of the Court,
pro-competitive factors could be involved in the use of exclusive dealing
contracts, 265 tying arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition. '266 The Court in Standard Stations explained
258. Id. at 229, 69 S. Ct. at 1055 (footnote omitted).
259. 237 U.S. at 300, 69 S. Ct. at 1055.
260. 258 U.S. 451, 42 S. Ct. 363 (1922). In United Shoe, the government challenged,
under the Clayton Act, a contractual requirement that had the effect of prohibiting lessees
of the defendant's machinery from using, for other steps in shoe manufacturing, com-
petitors' machinery. 258 U.S. at 458, 42 S. Ct. at 365. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decree of the trial court enjoining defendant's use of the lease restrictions. A few years
earlier the Court had affirmed a trial court decision holding that these restrictions did
not violate the Sherman Act. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38
S. Ct. 473 (1917).
261. 298 U.S. 131, 56 S. Ct. 701 (1936), finding a Clayton Act section 3 violation
in IBM's keypunch machine lease restriction requiring lessees to use only IBM's cards in
the machines. IBM argued unsuccessfully that the restriction was necessary to prevent the
use of unsuitable cards in the machines. The Court stated that "[t]he Clayton Act names
no exception to its prohibition of monopolistic tying clauses." Id. at 140, 56 S. Ct. at
705.
262. See 337 U.S. at 304, 69 S. Ct. at 1057.
263. Id. (quoting International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, 62 S.
Ct. 12, 15 (1947)).
264. The defendant's contracts required independent dealers in petroleum and auto-
mobile accessories to purchase from the defendant all of their requirements of various
products sold by the defendant. 337 U.S. at 295-96, 69 S. Ct. at 1053.
265. 337 U.S. at 306-07, 69 S. Ct. at 1058-59. The Court noted that requirements
contracts and exclusive dealing contracts may be of economic advantage to buyers and
the consuming public as well as to sellers.
266. 337 U.S. at 305, 69 S. Ct. at 1058.
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that (1) a tying seller could have no motive for a tie-in other than "the
prospect of reducing competition"; 67 and (2) the tie would be suc-
cessful-buyers would accept the tie-only if the seller had control of
the'supply of the tying device, "whether conferred by patent monopoly
or otherwise obtained. ' 268 The Court explained that in a Clayton Act
tying case the "existence of market control of the tying device ...
affords a strong foundation for the presumption that [the tying ar-
rangement] has been or probably will be used to limit competition in
the tied product also."' 2 69 Addressing itself specifically to the holding in
International Salt, the Standard Stations Court stated that a "patent,
moreover, although in fact there may be many competing substitutes
for the patented article, is at least prima facie evidence of such [market]
control.' '270
The Supreme Court in Times-Picayune, reviewing the trial court's
decision, agreed with the trial court that the volume of commerce affected
by the defendant newspaper's "unit system" of advertising was not
insignificant. 271 Thus, the question of the magnitude of defendant's
"market position [became] critical to the case.'' 272 The majority felt that
the relevant market was the local newspaper advertising market as a
whole2 73 and viewed the defendant as not having a "dominant" position
in that market.27 4 The Court viewed the "essence of illegality in tying
agreements" as "the wielding ofmonopolistic leverage" by a seller using
"his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the
next. ' 275 The Court found the defendant's forty percent share of the
overall newspaper market to be too low to confer "that market 'dom-
inance' which ... would result in a Sherman Act offense under the
rule of International Salt.'"276
267. 337 U.S. at 306, 69 S. Ct. at 1058.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 307, 69 S. Ct. at 1054 (emphasis added).
271. Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610, 73 S. Ct.
872, 881 (1953).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 612-13, 73 S. Ct. at 882-83.
274. 345 U.S. at 611, 73 S. Ct. at 882.
275. Id.
276. 345 U.S. at 612-13, 73 S. Ct. at 882-83. The defendant clearly had a monopoly
over the morning newspaper advertising market, as the four dissenting Justices (Burton,
Black, Douglas, and Minton) pointed out. 345 U.S. at 628, 73 S. Ct. at 892. Turner
contends that the Court misdefined the market and defendant's market share., Turner,
supra note 9, at 55 n.21. The defendant had a 100% share of the morning newspaper
market.
As an alternative grounds for its reversal of the trial court, the Times-Picayune Court
found that the defendant's morning and evening papers were not separate products but
a single product. 345 U.S. at 613, 73 S. Ct. at 883. Thus, there could be no forced
purchase of a second distinct product tied with the purchase of a desired product.
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The Times-Picayune Court's view of International Salt was that
proof of market dominance was required in International Salt, and was
"found to exist because the tying product was patented": "The patents
on their face conferred monopolistic, albeit lawful market control. 2 77
The only possible source that International Salt provides for that as-
sertion is the statement in International Salt that "appellant's patents
confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward. 2 78 In that
statement, however, the International Salt Court was not indicating that
it viewed the defendant as having a market-wide monopoly (or domi-
nance) over the salt machine market, but was, instead, expressing its
hostility to "patent extensions." The International Salt Court simply
did not decide that the defendant in that case had, by virtue of its
patent on salt machines, a dominance in the salt machine market.
Instead, the Court in International Salt held the defendant's tie-in to
be illegal without making any such inquiry.
Justice Clark, however, creating in Times-Picayune a requirement
that the seller in a Sherman Act tying arrangement case be shown to
possess economic power in the tying product, apparently felt compelled
to trace the economic power element back to International Salt.279 The
Times-Picayune Court, by imagining that in International Salt the patent
was viewed as supplying proof of market control, reconciled International
Salt, a case that was really decided under the theory of the patent
misuse cases, with this new model of Sherman Act tying arrangement
law. Justice Clark drew support for his view of the role played by
277. 345 U.S. at 608, 73 S. Ct. at 880.
278. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395, 68 S., Ct. 12, 15
(1947). Times-Picayune cites page 396 of the International Salt opinion instead of 395.
The full sentence from Times-Picayune reads as follows: "The patents on their face [in
International Salt] conferred monopolistic, albeit lawful, market control, and the volume
of sale affected by the tying practice was not 'insignificant or insubstantial.' Id. [referring
to International Salt] at page 396." Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608, 73 S. Ct. at 880.
This Times-Picayune reference to page 396 of the International Salt opinion is accurate
only for the second part of that sentence (that the International Salt opinion found that
a "not insignificant" volume of business was affected by the defendant's salt machine
lease restrictions).
279. Justice Clark's concept of economic power may have originated with an article
published in 1952 (one year prior to the Times-Picayune decision) by Lockhart and Sacks,
who stated that "when economic power over the controlled product is used as leverage
to market the tied product, harm to competition is reasonably certain." Lockhart and
Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements
Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 913, 944 (1952). According to
those writers, "prior to International Salt" the "usual approach" in measuring the effect
of all exclusive arrangements was to consider all relevant economic evidence. Id. at 951.
They view International Salt as changing that practice with respect to patented products.
Id. The article is cited in Times-Picayune is support of the statement that tying arrangements
serve only to suppress competition. 345 U.S. at 605 n.20, 73 S. Ct. at 878 n.20.
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patents in International Salt from the Standard Stations dictum con-
cerning tying arrangements found illegal under the Clayton Act, 280 quot-
ing the Standard Stations statement that a "patent ... is at least prima
facie evidence of market control." '28'
Loew's,282 like Paramount, involved a claim by the government that
motion picture distributors' block booking policies were illegal under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.283 In Loew's, however, unlike Paramount,
the Court had to make an inquiry as to whether the defendants possessed
economic power in the tying product market. The market "dominance"
requirement for per se illegality had, by the time of the Court's decision
in Loew's, been created in Times-Picayune2 4 and reformulated by the
Court in its Northern Pacific decision. 285 In Northern Pacific, decided
five years after Times-Picayune, the Court rejected the defendant's con-
tention, based on Times-Picayune, that the seller had to have "domi-
nance" or "monopoly power" over the tying product (land) for a per
se Sherman Act violation to be established. 286 According to Northern
Pacific, for Sherman Act section 1 illegality the tying seller had to be
shown to have "sufficient economic power [in the tying product] to
impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied prod-
uct. ' 2
87
The Times-Picayune dictum indicating that in prior tying cases "pat-
ents or copyrights supplied the requisite market control ' 28 would seem,
for the Loew's decision, to be sufficient to resolve the question of
280. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608, 73 S. Ct. at 880 (quoting Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 1059).
281. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 611 n.30, 73 S. Ct. at 882 n.30 (quoting Standard
Stations, 337 U.S. at 307, 69 S. Ct. at 1059). That statement, of course, confuses the
patentee's control over the patented device with marketwide control. See supra notes 100-
216 and accompanying text.
282. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962).
283. The block booking in Paramount was imposed on movie theater owners, while
in Loew's the buyers were television stations.
284. Paramount was decided in 1948, Times-Picayune in 1953, and Loew's in 1962.
285. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 514 (1958).
286. Id. at 11, 78 S. Ct. at 521.
287. Id. Northern Pacytc may or may not have watered down the Times-Picayune
majority's view of the economic power prerequisite for a per se violation. If Justice Clark,
stating in Times-Picayune that a tying arrangement is per se illegal under the Sherman
Act if the tying seller has a "monopolistic position" in the tying product market, meant
to require monopoly power in the section 2 Sherman Act sense, then Northern Pacific
did water down the Times-Picayune requirement. If, on the other hand, Justice Clark,
in stating that the tying seller had to have a monopolistic position, was only referring
to "monopoly" in the economist's sense of power over price, the Northern Pacific and
Times-Picayune standards are not dissimilar.
288. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611, 73 S. Ct.
872, 882 (1953).
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whether the Loew's defendants had economic power with respect to
their copyrighted films. However, prior to Loew's, in Northern Pacific,
the majority opinion called into question Times-Picayune's statement
that economic power had been presumed in International Salt from the
patents on the tying products. 28 9 In Northern Pacific, Justice Black, who
had been one of the dissenters in Times-Picayune, wrote as follows:
The defendant attempts to evade the force of International Salt
on the ground that the tying product there was patented while
here it is not. But we do not believe this distinction has, or
should have, any significance. In arriving at its decision in
International Salt the Court placed no reliance on the fact that
a patent was involved nor did it give the slightest intimation
that the outcome would have been any different if that had not
been the case. If anything, the Court held the challenged tying
arrangements unlawful despite the fact that the tying item was
patented, not because of it.2 90
The question before the court in Northern Pacific was whether the
defendant's "preferential routing clauses" in contracts for the sale or
lease of land violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. These clauses
required purchasers or lessees of the land to ship all commodities pro-
duced on the land over Northern Pacific's rail lines.2 91 The trial judge
ruled for the government on its motion for summary judgment.192 On
appeal the defendant argued (1) that the agreements did not constitute
per se unreasonable restraints of trade; and (2) that the pleadings had
raised material issues of fact concerning the economic consequences of
the agreements, precluding the grant of summary judgment. 293 The Court
289. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 9, 78 S. Ct. 514, 520 (1958).
Justice Clark, the author of the Times-Picayune majority opinion, took no part in the
Northern Pacific decision. Justice Black, who had dissented in Times-Picayune, wrote the
majority opinion in Northern Pacific. Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker dissented
in Northern Pacific.
290. Id. In a footnote the Court stated:
Of course it is common knowledge that a patent does not always confer a
monopoly over a particular commodity. Often the patent is limited to a unique
form or improvement of the product and the economic power resulting from
the patent privileges is slight. As a matter of fact the defendant in International
Salt offered to prove that competitive salt machines were readily available which
were satisfactory substitutes for its machines (a fact the Government did not
controvert), but the Court regarded such proof as irrelevant.
356 U.S. at 10 n.8, 78 S. Ct. at 529 n.8.
291. Purchasers and lessees were allowed to use another shipper if that shipper's rates
were lower than Northern Pacific's. 356 U.S. at 12, 78 S. Ct. at 521.
292. 142 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Wash. 1956). Appeal was taken directly to the Supreme
Court under the Expediting Act of 1903. 356 U.S. at 4, 78 S. Ct. at 517.
293. See 356 U.S. at 7-9, 78 S. Ct. at 519-20.
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affirmed the trial court decision. 294 The Northern Pacific Court's state-
ment concerning the role played by patents in International Salt came
in response to Northern Pacific's contention that, under the Times-
Picayune rule, economic power must be established by market share
data unless the tying product was, as in International Salt, patented. 295
In addition to Northern Pacific's denial that any patent presumption
was used in International Salt, the reasonableness of such a presumption
was, in the years between Times-Picayune and Loew's, questioned in
the Report of the U.S. Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws. 296 The Report stated in part:
From an antitrust standpoint, a tying clause in a patent license
is like a tying clause in any other contract. The Committee feels,
294. 356 U.S. at 7, 78 S. Ct. at 519. The Court also stated that the "very existence
of the host of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great
power, at least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the existence
of these restraints." Id. at 7-8, 78 S. Ct. at 519. According to Fortner H, "this approach
[to proof of economic power] depends on the absence of other explanations for the
willingness of buyers to purchase the package." Fortner 11, 429 U.S. 610, 618 n.10, 97
S. Ct. 861, 867 n.10 (1977).
The Northern Pacific dissenting Justices would have remanded the case to the trial
court "for a trial on the issue whether appellants' landholdings gave them that amount
of control over the relevant market for land necessary under this Court's past decisions"
for a per se violation. 356 U.S. at 13, 78 S. Ct. at 522.
The government in its Northern Pacific Supreme Court brief argued that a given piece
of land is just as unique as a patented product. Brief for the United States at 17, Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 514 (1958) (in 4. P. Kurland and G.
Casper, Antitrust Law: Major Briefs and Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the
United States 1955 Term-1975 Term 71, 90 (1979)). According to the government's Northern
Pacific brief, the availability of other salt machines was considered irrelevant in Inter-
national Salt: Since no other salt machine could be exactly like International Salt's patented
machine, buyers who for whatever reason preferred the International Salt machine had
to contract with International Salt. Thus, according to the government's Northern Pacific
brief, in International Salt, market control of the patented article was sufficient to enable
the seller to impose a tie (and similarly, Northern Pacific's control of its unique land
enabled Northern Pacific to impose a tie). Brief for the United States at 17.
295. 356 U.S. at 9, 78 S. Ct. at 520. Northern Pacific acknowledged that a section
I violation was found in International Salt without any market share evidence, but explained
that "[blecause the International Salt case turned on the use of patents as a tying device,"
that case was different. Brief for Appellants at 26, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 514 (1958) (in 4 Kurland and Casper, supra note 294, at 54-55).
During oral argument in Northern Pacific one of the Justices, questioning the govern-
ment's attorney, asked "[I]sn't it true that in a Sherman Act case there has to be some
monopolization of the market that restrains competition?" When, in response, the attorney
stated that no proof of monopolization had been required in International Salt, the Justice
warned him, "I don't think you ought to rely too much on International Salt, because
in the determining consideration there was the abuse of the patent, and that goes a long
way." 4 Kurland and Casper, supra note 294, at 140.
296. The Report was transmitted to the Attorney General in 1955.
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however, contrary to the apparent trend of Supreme Court opin-
ions, that in determining whether a tying clause may substantially
lessen competition under the Clayton Act, or is unreasonable
under the Sherman. Act, the fact that the tying product is pat-
ented need not be decisive of illegality. The patent may be broad
and basic, in which event the economic power incident to the
patent makes the tying clause illegal. On the other hand, the
patent may be narrow and unimportant, in which event it may
confer virtually no real market power. Accordingly, where the
tying product is patented, the patentee should be permitted to
show that in the entire factual setting, including the scope of
the patent in relation to other patented or unpatented products,
the patent does not create the market power requisite to illegality
of the tying clause. 297
According to the Report, "On a number of occasions the Court ...
regarded the patent itself as involving sufficient market power to make
any tying clause [involving a patented tying product] a violation of the
antitrust law. ' 298
The Loew's trial court,29 9 possibly because of this Report statement
and Northern Pacific's questioning of whether a patent presumption was
used in International Salt, relied primarily on Paramount's condemnation
of block booking's "enlargement of the monopoly of the copyright"
to decide that the defendants had violated the Sherman Act.3 ° The
Supreme Court affirmed, stating that Loew's and the other "appellants
cannot escape the applicability of Paramount Pictures"30' and that ap-
pellants block booked contracts were "covered by the flat holding in
Paramount Pictures ... that 'a refusal to license one or more copyrights
unless another copyright is accepted' is 'illegal."' 3 2 For the Supreme
297. Report of the U.S. Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws at 238 (1955) (emphasis added, footnote omitted). In footnote 57 the Report listed
the "misguided" Supreme Court cases, United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 522, 58 S. Ct. 1107, 1121 (1948); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 73 S. Ct. 872 (1953); and International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947).
298. Report at 238 n.57.
299. 189 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
300. 189 F. Supp. at 378-79 (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 157, 68 S. Ct. 915, 929 (1948)).
The Loew's trial court made only a passing reference to Times-Picayune, stating that
"[t]he Paramount decision has been referred to with approval on several subsequent
occasions by the Supreme Court. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States." 189
F. Supp. at 379.
301. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48, 83 S. Ct. 97, 103 (1962). Appeal
was taken directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act. 371 U.S. at 44, 83
S. Ct. at 101.
302. Id. at 50, 83 S. Ct. at 105 (emphasis added).
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Court, however, Paramount's prohibition of block booking was not a
sufficient basis for affirming the trial court's decision. While Paramount
was decided before Times-Picayune, Loew's was decided after Times-
Picayune and the creation of the "dominance" or "economic power"
element of per se illegality. The influence of Times-Picayune apparently
compelled the Court in Loew's to do more than rely on the Paramount
prohibition of block booking. The Loew's Court, acknowledging that
tying arrangements are per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman
Act only if the seller has economic power in the tying product, 30 3 stated
that "[tihe requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product
is patented or copyrighted." 304 In support of this statement, the Court
did not cite Times-Picayune, where the only earlier dictum to that effect
appears. Instead, the Court cited International Salt and Paramount.30 5
The Court, presented in Loew's for the first time with the necessity of
deciding whether economic power should be presumed from a copyright
on the tying product, adopted the Times-Picayune view of the role
played by patents in International Salt. The Loew's Court, stating that
"[t]he requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is
patented or copyrighted," cited International Salt as direct support for
that statement.3 06 International Salt provides support for the Loew's
presumption of economic power only if the Times-Picayune view of
International Salt is correct-if, in International Salt, the Court viewed
the patents on the tying product as supplying proof of market control.30 7
According to Northern Pacific, however, the fact that the International
Salt tying products were patented played no role in that decision. 30 1
Paramount provides no support at all for the presumption, for there
was no discussion of economic power in Paramount.309
The Court in Loew's attempted to reconcile the Paramount basis
of its decision with Times-Picayune's requirement that a tying seller be
shown to have economic power. The Court stated in response to Loew's
argument that the government had failed to establish that the defendants
had economic power, that "[a]pplicability of Paramount Pictures brings
with it a meeting of the test of Northern Pacific, since Paramount
Pictures is but a particularized application of the general doctrine as
reaffirmed in Northern Pacific. ' 310 Here the Court was clearly engaging
303. Id. at 45, 83 S. Ct. at 102.
304. Id. The Loew's trial court had not inquired as to whether the defendants had
economic power in the tying products. See 189 F. Supp. at 381.
305. 371 U.S. at 45-46, 83 S. Ct. at 102.
306. Id.
307. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611, 73 S.
Ct. 872, 881 (1953).
308. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 9, 78 S. Ct. 514, 520 (1958).
309. See notes 243-47 supra and accompanying text.
310. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 50, 83 S. Ct. at 104.
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in fiction. Paramount was decided as a "copyright misuse" case, by
analogy to the patent misuse cases (if it is illegal for a seller to enlarge
a patent monopoly by requiring those wanting a patented tying product
to also take unpatented supplies, it must be illegal for a seller to require
those wanting a high quality copyrighted film to also take inferior
films).' 1. Paramount was decided in 1948, five years before the Court,
in Times-Picayune, decided that tying arrangements are per se illegal
only if the seller has "dominance" or economic power in the tying
product.
The Loew's Court acknowledged the influence of patent misuse cases
on the Loew's presumption, stating that the principle of presuming
economic power if the tying product is patented or copyrighted "grew
out of a long line of patent [misuse] cases. ' 3 12 The influence of the
patent misuse cases on the development of the Loew's presumption was
actually very direct. One basis of the Loew's decision is Paramount,
really a "copyright misuse" case condemning block booking on the
theory that movie block booking was, like patent tie-ins to unpatented
supplies, an illegal attempt to extend a statutory intellectual property
monopoly. The other basis of the Loew's Supreme Court decision, the
premise that patents supplied proof of economic power in International
Salt, arose when the Times-Picayune Court created the economic power
requirement and then attempted to reconcile International Salt-a patent
misuse decision-with the new view of tying arrangement illegality by
explaining that patents supplied proof of economic power in International
Salt.
IV. CONCLUSION
Economic power should not be presumed from the fact that the
tying product is patented or copyrighted. The Supreme Court in its most
recent tying arrangement cases has made it clear that a tying arrangement
is illegal only if the tying seller has "power over price" with respect
to the tying product. The existence of patent or copyright protection
on a tying product does not indicate that the product's seller has
economic power with respect to that product. For economic power to
exist, the tying product must, first of all, be a product that is desired
by consumers. The fact that a tying product is patented or copyrighted
does not indicate that the product is desirable. For desirable tying
products the existence of patent or copyright protection would give the
seller economic power if the patent or copyright prevented the seller's
311. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-58, 68 S. Ct.
915, 929 (1948).
312. 371 U.S. at 46, 83 S. Ct. at 102.
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competitors from creating functional equivalents for the tying product.
Although the Supreme Court has justified the presumption of economic
power on the basis of the patent and copyright exclusionary rights, the
exclusionary rights do not enable the patentee or copyright holder to
prevent the development and sale of substitutes for the tying product.
Neither a patent nor a copyright creates a market-wide monopoly, and
neither form of intellectual property protection prevents the production
of functionally equivalent products.
The Loew's presumption developed from an inappropriate appli-
cation of patent misuse principles to Sherman Act tying doctrine. The
development of the presumption involved no real inquiry into the ques-
tion of whether a patent or copyright conferred power over price. The
presumption, as Justice O'Connor has stated," 3 finds no real support
in the Court's tying cases.
313. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1572 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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